Bank Proprietary Trading and Investment in Private Funds: Is the Volcker Rule a Panacea or Yet Another Maginot Line? by Nabilou, Hossein
Bank Proprietary Trading and Investment in Private
Funds: Is the Volcker Rule a Panacea or Yet Another
Maginot Line?
Hossein Nabilou*
The Volcker Rule is part of the post-financ'ial-crisis regulutort' relorrns that
partly aim at adtlressing problems associqted with proprietury lruding by hcu*ing
entities and the risks associqted tvith the interconne('tedness o/'privute./itnds (e.9.,
hectge.funds ancl private equity.funds) with Large Comple'r F-ittcutciol Instilulions
(fCpls). This reform aim is pursued by introducirtg provision,s that prohibit
proprietary tracling and banking entities' investntenf in qtul sponsorship of' pritrate
..funtls. These prohibitions have three spec'ific objeclives: udcù'es,sing prohlems uri'sirrg
.from the interconnectedness of private .funds v,ith LCFIs; prcventing c'ross'
subsiclization of private .funds by depository institutions huvirrg 4(cess Ío
governnxent explicit ancl implicit guarantees; and regttltrtion of' conflicts of
interest in the relationship between banks, their cttstonter's, und privafe.fìmds.
Having studied the provisions of the Volcker Rule in light ú its oh.iectives, this
articli highlights the potential problems n'ith the Rule cutd provicles cm eorly
assessment as to how successful the Rule is in achievittg its ohiectit'e,s.
with respect to achieving these obiectives, the volcker Rule ctut onlv be
pqrtially successful for various reasons. The.foremost relsott is lhe nunterous builÍ-'in 
exceptions (i.e.,'permittecl qc'tivities') in the Rule ùu'luded us q rasult o./ political
compromises. Although the permitted octivities under the Rule urc bockecl b1' sotfitd
ecoiomic reasoning, there are serious prac'tical problertrs tvith lhese exceplions. The
main problem involves distinguishing prohibited activities.fi'om permilted aclit'iÍie,s.
Such determinations require regulatory agenc'ies to trlqke sub.iective cucl case-by
case evaluations of activities. It is not knov,n w,hat the co:its of such determinqliotts
would be in practice or how regulators would rau<'t if' the t'osts o./' su<'h
determinqtions exceed their benefits.
Regarding concerns about moral hazard, the Volcker Rule strikes o reosonahle
balance between preventing such an opportunistic' behrt'iour (i'e ., tuking advuntqge
o.f government subsidies) while not sti/ting the investmattt bv lhe hu*ing industrf i¡7
stqrFup private.funcls. However, with regard to rrtitigafion of cortflicls o.f interest,
the Volcker Rule only marginally addresses suc'h c'oncertts. Thil¡ limited regulutortt
intervention in mitigating conflicts of interest coulcl be purticrll¡' undersÍood in light
of the fact thst market .forces and private lax' have been utccess./itl in uddressing
c:onflict-of-interest concerns originating.from the relcttionships be lu'e en hedge ./iutds
and the banking industry.
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La règle Volcker s'inscrit dans le cadre des rélbrnrcs qui ont.fait suite cì la t,rise
.financière et dont un des objectifs était de régler les problèmes liés qux ctt'titités tle
négociation pour compte propre des banques et aux risque,s résultunt de
I'interconneclivité des fonds privés (par exemple, des.fonds de t'ouverture et tles
fonds de capital investissement) parrainés par de grandes institufions .fittcurcières
complexes. Pour atteindre cet objectif, on propose des dispositiorrs qui interdiront
les activités de négociation pour compte propre ainsi que les invesÍissenrcnts per des
entités bancaires dans des ./bnds privés et leur parrainage cle tals /ontls. Ces
interdictions ont trois objectifs précis : régler les problèntes tlét,oulunt tle
I'interconnectivité des fonds privés et des grandes institutions .finunt'ières
complexes; empêcher l'interfinancement des fonds privës par cles insÍitutions tle
dépôt ayant accès à des garanties gouvernementales, apparentes ou inrplitites;
régler les conflits d'intérêts entre les banques,leurs clients et les.fonds privës. Après
qvoir examin,i les dispositions de la règle Volcker à la luntière de c'el¡ objet,ri/s,
I'auteur se penche sur les problèmes éventuels pouvqnt être causé,s par lu règle
Volcker et pr¿sente une évaluation préliminaire de I'efficac,ité de cette règle.
Pour ce qui esl de la réalisation de ses objectifs,la règle Volc'ker ne ¡teut urtoir
qu'un succès limité et ce, pour diverses raisons, la principale ëtanÍ que lu règle
comporte plusieurs exceptions (c'est-cì-dire des < activitës perntises >) introtfuites cì
raison de compromis de nature politique. Les activités pernüses pur la règle
s'appuient sur un solide raisonnement ëconomique, mais posenl cle sérieux
problèmes sur le plan pratique. Le principal problème réside dans lu tliÍliculté de
distinguer les activités interdites de celles permises. Pour établir c'eue distitt<,tion,
les qutorités de rëglementation doivent.faire une tivaluation subjet'tive et qu cus per
cas des activités. Il est dfficile d'établir les corîîs réels de ces déterminutiotts ou
comment les autorités de rëglementation réagiraient si le s c.otît,ç de t'es
dëterminat ions s' avé raient supérieur s aux avantages proc'wé s.
Pour ce qui est des prëoccupations liées à l'aléo de tttoralité,lu règle Volcker
établit un équilibre rqisonnable entre la nécessitt! d'empêcher cles contportanrcnts
opporlunistes (c'est-à-díre de tirer profit de subventions gouvernemettÍules) eÍ la
nécessité de ne pas décourager les investissements par le ser'Íeur bcmt'uire clcuts des
.fonds privés en démarrage. Toutefois, dans l'élabot'qtion de la règle Vok'ker, on ct
montré peu de préoccupation pour l'atténuation des conflits d'intérêts: c'ac,i
s'explique peut-être en partie parce que les ,forces du marchë et le tlroit privé
sont pqrvenus à r,lgler les situations de conflits d'intérêts soulevés pur les liens
entretenus par les.fonds de couverture avec le secteur bancaire.
1. INTRODUCTION
The US presidential campaign of 2016 rekindled one of the age-old
economic, legal, and political controversies about the powers and structures of
big banks.l The debate about the structural reforms of the banking sector, which
Both candidates in the Democratic Party's 2016 presidential primary elections, Hillary
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is reminiscent of the Glass-Steagall Act, drove a wedge between presidential
candidates and made itself one of the topical issues at the top of the banking
reform agenda. An implied consensus from both sides of the political spectrum
has emerged on the assertion that the hnancial regulatory refo^rms introduced in
the aftermath of the financial crisis have not gone far enough.2 This is in spite of
the fact that in 2010, US regulators introduced sweeping regulations with the aim
of restricting banking powers and restructuring the industry. These reforms came
in the wake of the global financial crisis that stirred tidal waves of new
regulations on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, the most signifìcant
sweeping change was the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wqll Street Re./brm cutd
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) passed on July 21,2010.3 This Act
triggered massive regulatory reforms and resulted in a major overhaul of the
regulatory environment of US fìnancial markets. These relorms are only
comparable, in extent and depth, to the financial regulatory overhaul the US
made in the wake of the Great Depression.a
The main objectives oî the Dodd-Fronk Ac't are to promote "the fìnancial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive lìnancial services
practices."s To promote fìnancial stability and address systemic risk, the Dodd-
Clinton and Bernie Sanders, advocated breaking up banks by using the Glass-Steagall
prohibitions. See Barney Jopson, Courtney Weaver & Ben Mclannahan, "Explaining
bernie Sanders' .Too Big To Fail' Plan", Financial Times, (8 April 2016) online:
< https://www.ft.com/content/8a I 76bc0-fd a2-11e5-a3la-7930bacb3f5f > . For Hillary
Clinton's pre-general election position on the banking reforms agenda, see Gary
Sernovitz,;'What HillaryClinton Gets (and Bernie Sanders Doesn't) about Wall Street",
Tlrc Ney, Yorker (10 December 2015), online: < http:/i www.newyorker.com/business/
currency/hillary-clinton-gets-bernie-sanders-doesnt-wall-street > .
It is not only politicians who take this position; the idea that financial regnlations have
not gone far enough has its proponents in academic circles, too. See Ross P. Buckley, ct
al., Reconceptualising Global Finance and its Regulalion (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2016) at 3-6.
See Charles W. Calomiris, "The Political Lessons of Depression-Era Banking Reflorm"
(2010) 26 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 540, giving an accotrnt of banking
regulatory reforms in the aftermath of the Great Depression.
The Dodd-Frank Act was 845 pages long and included 16 titles and225 new rules
involving I I agencies. See Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson. "lmplications of
the Dodd-Frank Act" (2012) 4 Annual Reviey'of Financial Econontics I [Acharya &
Richardsonl at 2. It is estimated that the Act will result in approximately 400 rulcs and 87
studies before being lully implemented. See Davis Polk, "Dodd-Frank Rulemaking
Progress Report: Progress as of June l, 201 l" (201 l), online: < https://www.davis-
polk.com/files/uploads/Do dd-F r ankYo20documents/Dodd- Fra nk. Progrcss Report. -
jun I I .pdl> . Thus far, a majority of the regulations proposed pursuant to the Act have
been passed. See Davis Polk RegulatoryTracker, Dodd-Frank Progrcss Reporr: October
20t3(2013)online: <https://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-
Report/ > .
Negative reactions to the Dodd-Ft'ank Act abound. See Michael Hirsh, "Bonfire of the
4
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Frank Act introduces far-reaching provisions focused on microprudential as well
as macroprudential regulation.6 One of the main regulatory provisions
embedded in Section 619 of the Title VI of the Dodd-Frqnk Act isthe so-called
Volcker Rule (bearing the name of its mastermind, Paul Volcker¡.7 The Rule
seeks to restrain banks' proprietary trading activities and sever banks'
sponsorship of private investment funds. By doing so, the Rule intends to
ameliorate three basic problems in the fìnancial sector by: (i) containing systemic
risk by severing inter-linkages between private funds (hedge fundss and private
equity funds) and depository institutions; (ii) addressing conflicts of interest
where depository institutions engage in proprietary trading and sponsorship of
private funds; and (iii) limiting the transfer of government subsidies from
depository institutions to private funds (cross-subsidization of plivate funds by
government subsidies through depository institutions).e
This article provides an early assessment of the promises and pitfalls of the
Volcker Rule and evaluates the success of the Rule in achieving its objcctivcs. In
Loopholes" Newsweek (21 May 2010) online: <http://www.icrrragroup.org/asscts/
documents/Maket-Practice/Regulatory-Policy/Repo-Markets/Shaclow-banking-ancl-
repo-20-March-20l2.pdf> (calling the Dodd-Frank Act "the Accounta¡rts' and
Lawyers'Welfare Act of 2010" because it may boost their business).ó Microprudential regulation is about the study of the exposure of an individual fì¡rancial
institution to exogenous risks but it does not take into account the systenric irnportancc
of an individual financial institution. In other words, microprudential rcgulation is
about the stability ofeach individual institution and its objective is to forcc an indiviclual
financial institution to behave prudently. See Markus Brunnermeier ct ul., "The
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Report on thc World
Economy 6-8", International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (2009), online
< https://www.princeton.edu/"markus/research/papers/Geneva I l.pdf > [Brunncrmei-
er et al.].
In contrast, macroprudential regulation involves safeguarding the stability of the
financial system as a whole. It requires a system-wide analysis and involves idcntilying
the principal risk factors in a macro-level financial system. See Miquel Dijkman, .4
Framett,ork .for Assessing Systentic R¡sÀ, The World Bank Opcn KnowledgeRepository (20l0), online: < http://is.vsfs.czlell6410lleto20l4lD_^ffT l379tl0ó lium/
umI260I52812602338/systemic_risk_WPS5282_l_.pdf > See also Brunnermeicr c/ c/.,
at 10.
t l2 U.S.C. $ 1851. The Volcker Rule is sometimes called 'Glass-Steagall Lite'. Indeed,
only four sections of the Banking Act of 1933 comprise lhe Glass-Steagall Act.8 See Hossein Nabilou & Alessio M. Pacces, "The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma:
Direct vs. Indirect Regulation" (2015) 6 William & Mary Business Law Review 183
[Nabilou & Pacces] at 185-186 (defining hedge funds as "investment vehicles that are
privately organized, with specific fee structures, not widely available to the public, aimed
at generating absolute returns irrespective of the nrarket movements (Alpha) through
trading rather than investment income, and by making use ofl a variety of trading
strategies at their disposal").n See l2 U.S.C. $ l85l(bXl). These objectives can be inferred from the Volcker Rule as it
requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to provide a study ¿rs to the
achievement of these objectives, among others.
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doing so, after shedding light on the underlying economic logic for the
introduction of the Volcker Rule and elucidating its objectives, this article will
highlight the potential loopholes and flaws in the Rule that might get in the way
of the Rule achieving its objectives. The frrst section examines the core objectives
of the Volcker Rule and the second section delves more deeply into the study of
the provisions of the Rule - particularly its prohibitions on proprietary trading
and restrictions on investment in hedge and private equity funds. The third
section evaluates the potential economic consequences of the Rule for the hedge
fund industry, the banking sector, and the broader economy.
(a) The objectives of the Volcker Rule
In general, the Volcker Rule seeks to address three problems in the fìnancial
sector: (i) managing and containing systemic risk by attempting to close the
contagion channels and sever the inter-linkages between private funds and
depository institutions; (ii) addressing conflicts of interest where depository
institutions engage in proprietary trading and investment in or sponsorship of
private funds; and (iii) limiting the transfer of government subsiclies from
depository institutions to private funds.
(b) Regulating systemic risk by closing contagion channels
one of the main objectives of the volcker Rule is to address the risks
originating from the interconnectedness of private funds with Systemically
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) with the aim of containing risk-
spillovers from private funds to depository institutions. The Volcker Rule has its
genesis in the recommendations of the Group of Thirty^(chaired by PaulVolcker)
issued immediately after the global fìnancial crisis.rO The report highlighted
several problems with proprietary trading and interrelationships of banking
entities with hedge funds. The most notable of these problems involved potential
systemic aspects of hedge funds and their interconnectedness with LCFIs. The
report emphasized that, among others, large losses in proprietary trading and
sponsorship of hedge funds and exposure to structured credit products during
the financial crisis placed banking entities at risk and undermined their ability. to
honour their obligations towards their clients, counterparties, and investors'rl
In order to understand the systemic risk concerns about hedge funcls and
their relationships with banks, it is important to view hedge funds as part of the
shadow banking system. The shadow banking system (also known as securitized
banking) is a system of credit intermediation involving activities antl institutions
outside the traditional banking system.12 It mainly refers to the origination,
l0 The Group of Thirty, ..working Group on Financial Reform, Financial Reform: A
Framework for Financial Stability" (2009), online: < http:i/fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/
policyY,20page/G30Report.pdf > [The Group of Thirty, working Group on Financial
Reforml.tt lbid. at 27.
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acquisition, and pooling of debt instruments into diversihed pools o[ Ioans and
fìnancing those pools with short-term external debt.l3 It is mainly because of this
function, which largely overlaps with core banking activities, that shadow banks
are given the label of "non-banks performing bank-like functions".ra The
shadow banking system is also considered as an alternative term for market
fìnance,l5 because it "decomposes the process of credit intermediation into an
articulated sequence or chain of discrete operations typically performed by
separate specialist non-bank entities which interact across the wholesale financial
market".l6 In the recent global financial crisis, the shadow banking system
played a major role;I7 however, relatively less attention was paid to it in the
regulatory overhaul of the financial markets triggered by the repelcussions of the
crisis. l8
The key to identifying shadow banks is spotting the maturity-transformation
function in their activities.le Maturity transformation entails a mechanism for
intermediation through which short-term deposits are transformed into long-
l2 Financial Stability Board, "Progress in the lmplementation of the C20 Reconlmenda-
tions for Strengthening Financial Stability: Report of the Financial Stability Board to
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors" (2011), online <http://
www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_l 104I5a.pdflpage_moved: I > [Financial Stabi-
lity Boardl.l3 Nicola Gennaioli et al.,"A Model of Shadow Banking", NBER Working Paper No.lTll (2011), online: <http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/flaculty/kdsalyeriLECTURES/
Ecn235a/PresentationPapersF I I /Shleifer_Vishny_ShadowBanking.pdf > .ra The "non-banks credit intermediation" is another ternr for shadow banking used by the
Financial Stability Board (FSB). See The Group of Thirty, Working Group on F-inancial
Reform, supra îote 10. See also Financial Stability Board, supra note 12.
'5 European Repo Council, Shadow Banking and Repo (2012),online < http://www.goo-gle.ca/url?sa: t&rct: j q: &esrc: s&source: web&cd : 2&ved : 0ahU-
KEwjrqLCNrcjRAhXj34MKHd I 5BJUQFgggMAE&url : hrtp% 3A V,2F o/o2Fww -
w.icmagroup.orgolo2Fassets%o2Fdocuments%2FMaket-Practice%o2FRegulatory-Pol-
icy%2FRepo-Markets% 2FShadow-banking-and-repo-20-March-20 I 2.pdf&us-
g: AFQiCNG_lonftTp6KfHwiUeTyxC9DEMXpQ > [European Repo Council].t6 lbid. See also European Commission, Green Paper: Shadow Banking (2012), online:
< http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/shadow/green-paper_en.pdf > .l7 Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, "securitized Banking and the Run on Repo" (2012)
104 Journal of Financial Economics 425. See also Gary B. Gorton, Slupped b), tlte
Invisible Hønd: The Panic of 2007 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) (illustrating in
detail the role ofshadow banks in the recent hnancial crisis).
18 See Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, "shadow Banking Regulation", Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report(2012), online: Federal Reserve Bank of NewYork < https://www. newyorkfed. org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_rcports/
sr458.pdf> (providinganoverviewoftheshadowbankingsectorandtherisksinvolved
therein).le AlessioM.Pacces&HeremansDirk,"RegulationofBankingandFinancial Markets"in
Alessio M. Pacces and R.J. Van den Bergh, eds., Encyclopedia of Law and Econonics:
Regtrlation and Economics, 2nd ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,2012) 950. Maturity
transformation in banking is often accompanied by liquidity transformation; however,
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term credits through borrowing short and lending long. In other words, this
concept involves issuing short-term liabilities to finance long-term assets. Banks'
role in maturity transformation, which involves holding longer-term assets than
liabilities, delivers major economic and social value by enabling sectors in the real
economy to hold shorter-term assets than liabilities. This ultimately encourages
long-term capital investments.20
Despite being highly benefìcial to the real economy, maturity transformation
involves major risks. These risks arise from the nature of the maturity mismatch
between assets (long-term loans) and liabilities (demand cleposits) of banking
entities, which has historically led to recurrent bank runs and panics.2r Banks
have traditionally developed specific arrangements to address risks of maturity
transformation, which is mostly reflected in their liquidity policies. These policies
often involve limiting the extent of maturity transformation in the bank, its
access to committed lines of credit from other banks,22 and its borrowing from
interbank markets.23
In addition to the internal risk-mitigating strategies of a bank, governments
guarantee bank deposits up to certain limits. Deposit insurance was primarily
introduced to prevent bank runs and panics and to sustain fìnancial stability.24
Furthermore, banks are provided with access to the 'discount window' or the
'lender of last resort' (LOLR) facilities of central banks. These central bank
facilities are devised to prevent bank runs on illiquid-but-solvent banks if they
face liquidity problems due to their inability to borrow from interbank markets.
there might be instances in which banks engage in liquidity transformation without
engaging in maturity transformation.
20 Financial Services Authority, "The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the
Global Banking Crisis" (2009), online: Financial Services Authority < http://www.Ísa.-
gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf > [Financial Services Authority]. See also Gary B.
Gortott, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Wltlt We Don't Sec Thent Conting (oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).2f Charles P. Kindleberger & Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics, qnd Crosltcs: A Hi.çtor.t'o.l
Financial Cnses (Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005) at $ 5.
22 Financial Services Authority, supronote20 at2l.
23 These mechanisms are not perfect. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, "Deciphering the
2007-2008 Liquidity and Credit Crunch" (2009) 23 Jorlrnal of Economic Perspectives 77
[Brunnermeier] (arguing that, for example, extending credit lines fronr other banks
would undermine the risk profile of the bank that is extending credit. I n aclclition, in times
of crisis, liquidity in the interbank market may dry up, which can pose funding risks to the
banking system).
2a AlanS.Blinder&RobertF.Wescott,"ReformoftheDepositlnsurance: AReporttothe
FDIC (2001)", online: < https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/initiative/re-
form.html > [Blinder & Wescott]. Indeed, the protection of small dcpositors is an
incidental benefit of deposit insurance schemes. For an opposing view on deposit
insurance, see Charles W. Calomiris, "ls Deposit Insurance Ncccssary? A Historical
Perspective" (1990) 50 The Journal of Economic History (arguing that not only is the
deposit insurance in its current form unnecessary, but it is also a contributing factor to
instability in the banking system).
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All these protections are to ensure that core functions of banking entities (i.e.,
maturity transformation and their role in the payment system) are not impaired
due to sudden liquidity shocks.2s
However, unlike banks, which are allowed to accept deposits, shadow banks
mainly rely on credit markets for funding and are prohibited from taking
deposits.26 Accordingly, they also are not provided with a mechanism similar to a
deposit insurance scheme that insures their short-term liabilities. Moreover,
shadow banks do not enjoy explicit government guarantees, such as access to
liquidity back-ups (discount window). The absence of these liquidity-
management mechanisms exposes shadow banks to enormous risks of maturity
transformation.2T
Traditionally, maturity transformation was undertaken by the banking
sector due to their exclusive powers in taking deposits and lending.2s However,
with the advent of structured investment vehicles (SIVs), investment banks and
mutual funds created deposiflike investment opportunities. These investment
opportunities, with the prospects of upside gains, were made available by
promising on-demand redemption rights and implicit or explicit guarantees to
the investors that the capital invested in the fund will not fall below its initial
investment value.2e The risk in a system, which heavily relies on short-term
liabilities, is that if a liquidity crisis hits, the financial institutions have to
immediately sell long-term assets to meet redemption requests by investors that
contribute to systemic liquidity crises.30 Such maturity mismatches in shadow
banks, which caused deleveraging and resulted in fire sales and liquidity spirals,
are vastly documented in the recent global financial crisis.3l Due to the
2s Xavier Freixas et al.,"Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?"
(2000) I 8:63 Journal ofFinancial Services Research. See also Xavier Freixas & Bruno M.
Parigi, "The Lender of Last Resort of the 2 I st Century" in Andrew Fenton and Carmen
M. Reinhart, eds., Tlrc First Global Financial Crisis of the 2lst Cenrur¡': Part II Jutte-
December (2008) 163. Historically, the LOLR function in the market was played by
private financial institutions. An outstanding example of such role-playing occurred
during the crisis of 1907 when J. P. Morgan provided liquidity to markets and institutions
in the banking panic of that year. See Robert F. Bruner & Sean D. Carr, Thc Panic of'
1907: Lessons Learnedfi'om tlrc Market's Perfect,Sloln (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons,
lnc.,2007).
2u Even with all those prohibitions, money market mutual funds (MMMFs) dcveloped
products that were similar to demand deposits with prospect of upside gains called
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal accounts or NOW accounts.
27 Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, "shadow Banking: A Review of the Literature", in
Garrett Jones, ed., Banking Crises: Perspectives .f,'om tlrc Ney' Palgravc Dictionor¡,
(London, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016) 282 aT30l-306.
28 Linda Atlen, et al., "The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions" (2004) 36
Journal of Money, Credit & Banking 197. See also Julie L. Williams & James F. E.
Gillespie, "The Business of Banking: Looking to the Future-Part II" (1997) 52 The
Business Lawyer 1279.2' The so-called NOW accounts. See sapra note 26.
30 Financial Services Authority, supra note 20 at 2l .
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interconnectedness of shadow banks with banks, these individual deleveraging
and fìre sales in the shadow banking can spread to banks and, ultimately,
contribute to financial instability. As one of the major drivers of banking
regulation is systemic risk,32 and given the vulnerability o[ shadow banks to
liquidity shocks, the systemic-risk argument for regulating banks equally applies
to regulating shadow banks.
In addition, since traditional banks have already been heavily regulated,
there are concerns that lightly regulated shadow banks without those
government guarantees might pose greater systernic risks than the regulated
traditional banks.33 These risks include, inter alia, the interconnectedness of
shadow banks with the traditional banking system and other shaclow banks, a
lack of transparency and insuffìcient disclosure, agency problcms in the
securitization process, regulatory arbitrage, and high levels of leverage in the
shadow banking sector.34
Likewise, the maturity transformation in the hedge fund industry can be
undertaken through hedge funds or hedge fund-like entities' engagement in
originating derivative instruments such as mortgage backed securities (MBSs)35
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Although hedge funds do not often
engage in maturity transformation, they may engage in liquidity
transformation36 if they invest in securitized debt instruments and particularly
in MBSs.37 Therefore, some types of hedge funds can be considcrcd as shadow
banks. As mentioned above, absent government safety nets, clue to engagement
of shadow banks in maturity and liquidity transformation, they can be as fragile
3r Brunnermeier , supra note 23. See also Markus K. Brunnermeier & l-asse Hcje Pedersen,
"Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity" (2008)22 The Review of Financial Studies
220t.
32 Richard J. Herring & Anthony M. Santomero, "What is Optimal Financial Regula-
tion?" in Benton E. Gup, ed.,The nev'.financial architecture: Banking regulation in the
tv'enty:first century (Westport: Quorum Books, 2000) 5l ttt 52-54.33 It is apt to note that regulation, by itself, does not mean that bauks are saler than shaclow
banks. Empirical evidence suggests that the capital ofthe banking sector is far lower than
that of shadow banks. In other words, shadow banks are, on average, far less let eraged
than traditional regulated banks. From this perspective, taking excessive risk by
leveraged funds is seen as an unintended consequence of the govcrnment guarantees for
banks. See generally Anat R. Admati & Martin Hellwig, Thc Btmkls' Nan' Clothcs:
Wlmt's Wrong n,ith Banking and What to Do aboul 1l (Princcton: Princcton [Jnivcrsity
Press, 2013) [Admati & Hellwig].3a See European Repo Council, supranote 15.
3s To see how investments in MBs can be considered part of the shadow banking activities,
see Admati & Hellwig, supra ¡ote 33 at 148-166.
36 Financial Stability Board, "Shadow Banking: Scoping the Isstlcs. A Background Note of
the Financial Stability Board" (2011), online: Financial Stability Board <http://
www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r-ll04l2a.pdf> at 3. (According to thc FSB'
liquidity transformation is "the issuing of liquid liabilities to fìnancc illiquid asse ts.")
37 For the distinction between maturity transformation and liquidity tratrsfornratiou, see
Admati & Hellwig, suproîohe 33 at 148-166.
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as traditional banks.38 It follows that hedge funds' potential role in credit
intermediation can make hedge funds, as well as banking entities that are
connected to hedge funds, extremely fragile in case of any shocks to the system.
For example, SIVs heavily engaged in maturity transformation also helped
traditional banking entities to conceal the risks of off-balance-sheet items.le One
of the aims of the Volcker Rule is to address the problems originated from the
use of the components of shadow banks by banking entities. The Volcker Rule
attempts to close the channels of contagion through which the risks of shadow
banks might propagate to LCFIs.
(c) Mitigating conflicts of interest
The concerns about serious conflicts of interest in combining commercial and
investment banking were an effective driving force behind the introduction of the
Volcker Rule, as it was the case for its predecessor, the Glass-Steagull At.t.ao
Specifically, the Giass-S¡eagall Act was intended to address the conflicts of
interest embedded in fìnancing companies by financial intermediaries and those
offering securities to investors.ar Although some scholars cast doubt on this
situation as a serious case ol conflicts of interest,a2 the main concel'n was that
commercial banks, being the main lenders to companies and having good
knowledge of their financial situation, would sell risky and about-to-default
securities to unsophisticated investors.a3
In the context of commercial vs. investment banking, conflicts of interest
primarily lie in the different roles of commercial and investment banks.
Commercial banking traditionally involves taking deposits and granting loans,
while investment banks and securities dealers' functions include, inter aliu,
underwriting, selling, trading, and distributing securities. Therefore, a bank
acting as both a customer's agent and a dealer on the same transaction inevitably
faces conflicts of interest. For instance, an investment bank within a universal
38 Zoltan Pozsar et a/., "shadow Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Reports, no.458" (2010), online: Federal Reserve Bank of New York <https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/s1458_July_20 l0_-
version.pdf >.
3e Financial Services Authority, supranote20 at20.
a0 SeeGeorgeJ.Benston,TlrcseparationofCommercialattdlnvestntetttBanking; thcGlass-
Steagall Act Revisited and Reconsidered (Oxford'. Oxford University Press, 1990)
[Benston] at43-47.4t Amar Gande, "Commercial Banks in Investment Banking" in Anjan V. Thakor &
Arnoud Boot, eds., Handbook of Financial Intermediatiott and Banking (Burlington:
Elsevier Science, 2008) (providing an overview of potential conflicts of interest in the
universal banking model and discussing whether they are ofconcern ior regulators).a2 Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, "ls the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A
Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933" ( I 994) 84 American
Economic Review 810 [Kroszner & Rajan].a' Luigi Zingales, "The Future of Securities Regulation" (2009) 47 Journal of Accounting
Research 391 at 415-416.
THE VOLCKER RUt,E 307
banking model that underwrites initial public offerings (IPOÐ rnight ill-advisedly
suggest clients and customers (depositors) buy low-quality and less-promising
securities.a To mitigate this conflict of interest, the Glas,ç-Steugull At't prohibited
commercial banks from underwriting securities altogether by separating
commercial banks from investment banks.a5
The similarities between the rationales for the enactment of the G/css-
Steagall Act and the Volcker Rule are striking.a6 One of the impulses driving the
Glass-Steagall Atl was the financial crisis of the 1930s, which triggered sweeping
regulatory reforms. The reason that Congress enacted the G/r¿s,ç-Sr¿agoll Act was
that from 1930 to 1933, around 11,000 banks failed.aT The Congressional
hearings on the bill proposing the G/ass-Steagall Act found the causes of the
crash in the practices of the banking entities, which were proprietary in nature,
such as underwriting and investment in securities.a8 Although there were no
hedge funds at that time, the banks' involvement in activities akin to proprietary
trading and their interconnectedness with hedge fund-like investment vehicles,
which imposed signilìcant losses on banking institutions and gave rise to systemic
risk, acted as a catalyst for the enactment of the G/øs.ç'steagull At't.ae
aa One of the main cases of conflicts of interest in banks exists between its different
departments or divisions. The problem was that the re search departnrents of investment
banks were fìnanced by the profits of the investment-banking units. Such a situation gave
rise to conflicts of interest between banks' analysts ancl their investnrent-banking
division because, in such a system, the banks'analysts nright tend to (or be pressured to)
recommend securities that its investment banking unit underwrites. ln the encl,
discoveries of such conflicts of interest led to a separation of research and investment
banking division into two different subsidiaries, by establishing Cìhinesc walls between
research and corporate finance divisions within investnrent banks. See Shelagh
Heffernan, Modem Banking (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2005) [Hefflernan]
at 19-23.
a5 The Glass-Steagall Act also contained exceptions. For example, commercial banks were
allowed to underwrite municipal bonds, U.S. government bonds, and engage in private
placements.
ou John C. Coates IV, "The Volcker Rule as Structural Law: Implications for Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Administrative Law" (2015) l0 Capital Markets Law Journal 447 at 455-
458 (noting that, despite similarities, there are major differences between the two
regulations).
a7 See John R. Walter, 'Depression-Era Bank Failures: The Great Contagion or the Great
Shakeout?" (2005) 91 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 39 at 44-
46 (providing estimations of the enormity of bank failures during thc Great Depression).
4tr For an in-depth discussion and criticism ofthe allegations raised in the Pecora Hearings,
see Benston, s upra note 40 (enumerating and analyzing twclve reasons for the enactment
of the G/øss-Steagall Act, but concluding that most of them do not stand up serious
academic scrutiny). See also Charles Calomiris, "The Costs of Rejecting Universal
Banking: American Finance in the German Mirror, 1870- 1914" in Naonri R. Lamoreux
& Daniel M.G. Raff, eds., Coordination and Infornlation: Historical Parspct'lives ott the
Organization of Enterprise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) [Calomiris] at
257.
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There were huge controversies about the costs and benefits of the G/cs's-
Steagall Act and many commentators questioned its underlying rationale.50 For
example, it was estimated that securities underwritten by the banking entity's
affiliates within the universal banks outperformed comparable securities
underwritten by independent non-conflicted investment banks. What confìrms
these findings is that this superior performance was attributable to the lower-
rated and highly information-sensitive issues of securities.sr This fìnding clearly
runs counter to the idea that combining investment and commercial banking can
give rise to conflicts of interest.
Based on this fìnding, Kroszner and Rajan argue that the investor protection
argument, which underlies the role of conflicts of interest for separating
investment activities from core banking activities, is not justiliable.s2 They
further argue that, since the public markets and rating agencies were aware of the
potential conflicts of interest, they imposed a 'lemons market' discount on
information-sensitive securities underwritten by the afliliates of commercial
banks. [n response to this discount, the afhliates ol banking entities turned away
from underwriting information-sensitive securities and started underwriting
securities that were less information-sensitive.53 Their finding confirms the idea
that market forces can be effective in limiting the propensity of the affiliates of
commercial banks to take advantage of uniformed investors and provide
adequate monitoring mechanisms to rein in such potential conflicts of interest.
Based on the same line of reasoning, empirical evidence also suggests that
universal banks, which combine investment banking with commercial banking,
did not exploit such conflicts of interest.5a
The same concerns about mixing investment banking and commercial
banking can equally be a source of concern if a bank commingles commercial
banking activities with proprietary trading activities that are of the investment
banking nature. The strategies employed in proprietary trading are essentially
ae These allegations were raised in the Pecora committee investigations. See Benston, slpra
note 40 (almost challenging and undermining the underpinnings of all those allegations).
50 See Jonathan R. Macey, "special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Ft¡nction:
The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall" (1984) 33 Emory Law Journal I [Macey] (arguing that
this separation resulted from lobbying by investment banks to keep conrnrercial banks at
baY)'5r Kroszner & Rajan, supra note 42.
s2 lbid. at 829-830.
s3 lbid. Though counterintuitive, it seems that market-discipline-inspired self-regulation
originated from reputational concerns in repeated commercial transactions (versus
enforced self-regulation) and that private law rules addressing agency problems were, to
a great extent, effective in regulating the conflicts of interest in conrmercialbanking. Ibid.
See also Alan D. Morrison & William Wilhelm Jr., Investntent Banking: Institutions,
Politics, and Law (Oxîord: Oxford University Press, 2007) [Morrison & Wilhelm] at l2l -
ts4.
5a Manju Puri, "Commercial Banks in Investment Banking Conflict of lnterest or
Certification Role?" (1996) 40 Journal of Financial Economics 373.
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different from the core banking functions (maturity transformation). However,
these strategies are necessary for ellective undertaking ol risk-mitigating
strategies in the banking business, such as hedging and market-making
activities.55 Despite their useful role in the banking business, proprietary-
trading strategies can be a source ofconflicts ofinterest between clients ofa bank
and its proprietary trading desk.só The Group of Thirty's report confìrms that
the risks, market volatilities, and conflicts of interest originating fiom banking
entities' proprietary trading and their investment in_hedge funcls and private
equity funds are difficutt to measure and regulate.sT There at'e at least three
different instances in which combining proprietary trading with commercial
banking can result in conflicts of interest that give rise to investor protection
concerns.
First, if a banking entity incurs losses in proprietary trading, it might tend to
cover those losses at the expense ofclients'interests. Second, there are embedded
conflicts of interest in combining commercial banking and investment banking
activities that include proprietary trading. Commercial banking (i.e., taking
deposits and granting loans) provides banks with access to substantial amounts
of nonpublic information about the hnancial conditions of the borrowing
institution. This is especially signifìcant in commercial banks that engage in
relationship banking. If commercial and investment banking activities comingle,
as is the case in universal banks, those banks can trade on the non-public
information acquired through the course of the commercial banking business.
The proprietary trading undertaken by the proprietary trading desks of banks
are well positioned to engage in opportunistic behavior and exploit non-public
information at the expense of customers of the bank.
The third concern about conflicts of interest lies within the investment
banking business itself. For example, investment banking units of banking
entities offer advisory services to corporate customers on fìnancing, nlergers and
acquisitions, and many other different issues about fìrms. Srrch a role in the
fìnancial markets gives them privileged access to substantial arnounts of non-
public information.ss Indeed, if the Chinese walls between advising units of
universal banks and their trading desks are penetrable, the information leaked
from the advisory and lending units of banks to trading desks could be used by
the traders of the bank to profit from such non-public information potentially at
the expense of customers.
Two residual concerns about proprietary trading and the activities l'elated to
hedge funds remain. First, such activities involve complex fìnancial products and
55 Indeed, without these strategies, a commercial bank might not be able to effectively
manage its risks.
5u See Benston, supra note 40 at 205-206 (providing a thorough overview of these conflicts
of interest).
57 The Group of Thirty, Working Group on Financial Reform, sltpra note I 0.
st3 Ingo Walter, "Conflicts of Interest and Market Discipline Arnong Financial Service
Firms" (2004) 22 European Management Journal 361.
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transactions, such as highly illiquid and hard-to-value structured products.se
This inherent complexity further increases the information asymmetry between
market participants, mainly between originators and investors of the structured
products. Increased information asymmetry breeds opportunistic behavior and
amplifies the concerns for aggravated conflicts of interest. The second residual
concern is the concern about transparency, which paved the way for the
enactment of the Volcker Rule. The Group of Thirty's report furthel suggested
that the complexity of the proprietary trading and the need for confidentiality in
such operations limited the transparency of markets for both investors and
creditors.60 Generally, more transparent markets are more stable than opaque
ones. Opaque markets are particularly prone to shocks and instability caused by
illiquidity, which itself originates from uncertainty about the market
participants' counterparty credit risks.6l Because market participants are
uncertain about counterparty risks, they are less willing to lend to each other
in times of distress. The behavior of individual banks can easily result in a credit
crunch and liquidity shocks. Moreover, the report of the Group of Thirty alludes
to circumstances in which the board of directors of banking entities within which
proprietary trading and other banking activities are simultaneously conducted
may not be able to understand and control their diverse and complex mix of
activities.62 Although the issue of conflicts of interest has already been addressed
by different laws and regulations,63 and banks have erected walls between
5e Financial Stability Oversight Council, Study & Recommendations on Prohibitions on
Propríetary Trading & Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity
Funds (201l), online: U.S. Department of Treasury < https://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/Volcker % 20secY,20Y"206 I 9 % 20stu-
dy o/o20lrnalo/o20 I %20 1 8%20 I I Yo20r g.p df > at 48- 50 [Fi nancia I Sta bi li ty Oversi gh t
Councill.
60 The Group of Thirty, Working Group on Financial Reform, supra noÍe 10.6r Bengt Holmström & Jean Tirole, "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity" (1998) 106
Journal of Political Economy L
62 In addition, the report raised concerns about firms engaged in proprietary trading that
were supervised by the government and, thus, protected from the full force of nrarket
discipline. It suggested that such a situation gives rise to unfair competition with so-
called 'free-standing' institutions. The report concludes that large SIFIs should be
restricted when engaging in proprietary trading, which poses high risks and serious
conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the report recommended that banking institutions be
prohibited from sponsoring hedge funds and private equity funds and that strict capital
and liquidity requirements should be imposed on proprietary trading. In addition, it
recommended that the firms securitizing debt instruments should be required to retain a
meaningful part ofthe credit risk on the bank's balance sheet, the so-called 'skin in the
game' requirement. In other words, it suggested that banks should not comingle their
own funds in hedge funds in which their clients invest. See The Group of Thirty, Working
Group on Financial Reform, supra nole l0 at27-28.
63 In the US, three categories of laws impose conflicts of interest restrictions on banking
entities in their dealings with their customers. First, the fiduciaries' duty of loyalty under
State laws; secondly, the investment advisers'and commodity trading advisers'duty of
loyalty under federal and state securities and commodities laws, and the duty ofl loyalty
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'customer-serving activities' and 'proprietary trading desks' to prevent
information flow, the Volcker Rule attempts to close any remaining loopholes
in the banking entities' involvement in proprietary trading and hcdge lund and
private equity fund investment.6a
(d) Addressing moral hazard by timiting cross'subsidization
Moral hazard is a ubiquitous feature of fìnancial regulation, specifìcally-
where such regulation is intended to cope with problems of fìnancial stabitity.65
The government's attempt to preserve financial stability often requires the
proviiion of some sort of safety net for SIFIs.66 However, this safety net will give
financial institutions the impression that the government will bear the
consequences of their risk taking. Therefore, one of the unintended
consequences of having a safety net in __place is that it will encourage
opporiunistic behavior by regulated entities.6T
The moral hazatd problem stemming from an over-extended government
safety net, in turn, encourages excessive risk taking by too-big-to-fail and too-
interconnected-to-fail banks.68 This problem may not be limited to the banks
themselves; it can further be transmitted to other less-regulatecl parts of the
financial system when banks transact with hedge funds and private equity
funds.6e For example, for a long time, central bankers were concelned that banks
that take risks in the derivatives markets essentially exploit their unique access to
deposit insurance and discounted Fed lunds.7O Needless to say, a bank's
investment in a private fund amounts to similar exploitations to those that exist
in the derivatives markets.
attached to benefit plans under the Employee Retiremettt lttronrc Scrurit.t'lcl [ERISA].
And finally, there is a prohibition under the securities laws on obtaining an advantage by
using nonpublic infoimation about a customer or an issuer, such as laws prohibiting
insider trading. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, sui¡r,? note 59 at 48-50.
u4 lbid.
65 William A. Allen & Geoffrey Wood, "Defìning and Achieving F-inancial Stability"
(2006) 2 Journal of Financial Stability l6l '
66 Nadezhda Malysheva & John R. Walter, "How Large Has the Federal Financial Salety
Net Become?" (ZOtO) 96 Economic Quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 273
[Malysheva & Walter] at274-275.67 Admati & Hellwig, supra note 33.u, see Anthony saunders, "Banking and commerce: An Overview of the Public Policy
Issues" (1994) lS Journal ofBanking & Finance 231 (arguing that thc effects ofsuch an
overextended government safety net would be transmitted beyond the financial sector).
6e Viraf V. Acharya et al. "lnternational Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation" in
Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, eds., R¿s/or¡ilg Financiol Stahilit.l': Hot¡' lo
Repair a Failed-System (Hoboken: Wiley & Sons, Inc.,2009) 365 [Acharya et al.] at 366-
367.
70 Lynn A. Stout, "Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading under Conditions of
Uïcertainty can Increasè Risks and Erode Returns in F'inancial Markets" (1995) 2l
Journal ofCorporation Law 57.
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One of the main objectives of the Volcker Rule is to prevent the flow of
government subsidies to private funds.Tl As mentioned above, because of their
role in maturity transformation, depository institutions suffer from inherent
fragility, which has caused recurrent crises throughout the history of banking. To
prevent such crises, governments have provided safety nets by creating a web of
government guarantees for banking entities. In the US, there are both explicit
and implicit government guarantees for banks. Explicit guarantees include
deposit insurance schemes and privileged access to the LOLR facilities of the
Federal Reserve, such as its discount window in times of illiquidity for individual
banks or for the banking system as a whole. In addition, implicit guarantees for
banks are mostly provided in the form of bailouts for too-big-to-fail or too-
interconnected-to-fail banks. 72
Although a publicly funded deposit insurance scheme should neither
subsidize nor tax banking entities,T3 theoretical and empirical studies suggest
that there are substantial subsidies within the current schemes of government
explicit and implicit guarantees offered to banks.Ta The potential flow of
taxpayer-subsidized funds to private funds in the form of implicit guarantees or
provision of emergency liquidity by their parent banks can incentivize plivate
funds to engage in opportunistic behavior (i.e., taking excessive risks at the
expense of their parent banks). Their parent banks, in turn, will shift some of
their losses to the taxpayers rather than incurring such losses themselves.Ts
Therefore, regulators need to take steps to prevent the transmission of taxpayer-
subsidized funds to private unregulated funds.
Legislators were well aware of this moral hazard problem when they first
introduced the Glass-steagall Act.76 Indeed, the simultaneous introduction of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Glass-Steagull Act
included in the same bill (the Banking Act of 1933) was not a coincidence.
Initiated by Senator Carter Glass and Congressman Henry Steagall, the G/cs'.s-
Steagall Act was intended to prevent the risks of speculation by banks at the
7t Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 14.
72 Charles W. Calomiris, "Buildingan Incentive-Compatible Safety Net" (1999) 23 Journal
ofBanking & Finance 1499.
73 See Blinder & Wescott, supra note 24.
7a Bryan T. Kelly et a1., "'1oo-systemic-To-Fail: What Option Markets lmply About
Sector-wide Government Guarantees" NBER Working Paper Series, No. 17149 (2011),
online: < http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/finance/pdf/toosystemictofail-
whatoptionmarkets.pdf > .
75 Jason Hsu & Max Moroz, "Shadow Banks and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008" in
Greg N. Gregoriou, ed., The Banking Crisis Handbook 48-50, (Boca Raton: Taylor and
Francis Group, LLC, 2010) 39.
7ó See Charles W. Calomiris & Eugene N. White, "The Origins of Federal Deposit
Insurance" in Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, eds., The Regulated Et'ononr¡,; /
Historical Approach to Political Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I 994)
145 at l46lCalomiris & rWhitel (highlighting that the Roosevelt Administration initially
opposed federal deposit insurance based on the same reasoning).
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expense of the proposed FDIC. In so doing, the Act restricted commercial
banking activities to commercial lending and trading in less-r'isky assets' such as
government bonds, while other activities were placed in the investment banking
iramework.?7 Passed in 1933, the Act recognized that, with the introduction of
the deposit insurance corporation and requiring member banks to be insured by
the FDIC, some limits needed to be set on their activities. Hence' to prevent
opportunistic behaviour, such as excessive risk taking at the expense of the
f-litC, the Act prohibited federally insured banks from engaging in investment
banking and using deposits for trading on their own accounts' The Act was an
acknowledgement that most practigll way to do this was to separate commercial
banking frãm investment banking.Ts
Thè moral hazard problem also exists when private funds are subject to
indirect regulation by their prime brokers.Te For instance, banks' and elite prime
brokers'8o reliance on bailouts affects their counterparty credit risk management
and induces them to take a suboptimal level of care in dealing with hedge
funds.sl In addition, some prime brokers have taken on the role of hedge fund
'hotels', meaning that hedge funds are embedded within these institutions' Such
an institutional setting can result in compromised risk-management incentives in
the relationship between hedge funds and prime brokers. Moreover, this
arrangement can cause reputational damage to the prime broker if a hedge
fund ãperating within the prime brokerage firm fails. For example, prior to the
recent financial crisis, the collapse of two of Bear Stearns' hedge funds in the
spring of 2007 imposed losses on their systemically important parent company'8'
fn tnãt case, the óollapse of hedge funds did not impose substantial credit risks
77 Acharya &Richardson, s upranote 4 at5. See also Macey, supra note 50 (arguing that the
true impetus behind the Glass-Steagall AcI was lobbying by investment banks, which
resulted in an Act that protected investment banks from competition from commercial
banks).
78 Sections 16and2l of the G/ass-,Steagall Act.
7e A direct or entity regulation involves regulatory measures focusing immediately on the
regulation ofthe tarlet industry as a "disãrete activity or as part ofthe broader, regulated
iniestment services universe." In contrast to direct regulation, which is applied directly
to the hedge fund entity itself or to the activities performed directly by hedge funds,
indirect relulation inclúdes "market discipline-inspired regulatory_measures targeting
the creditors and counterparties of hedge funds (mainly, but not excltrsively, their prime
brokers and securities bròkers)." See Phoebus Athanassiou, Hedge kurd Regulation in
the European (Jnion: Current Trends and Future Prospect,s (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer
Law Intårnational, 2009) at227.Seealso Nabilou & Pacces, supra note I (arguing that
indirect regulation is the preferred approach for regulating hedge funds).
80 prime brokers, as part of major investment banks, are broker-dealers that clear and
frrnance customer trades exeôuted by one or more other broker-dealers, known as
executing brokers. See President's Working Group, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the
Lessonsãf Long-Term Capital Management B-4 (1999), online: < http://rvww.cftc.gov/
tm/tmhedgefundreport. htm > .tl Wulf A. Kaal, "Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III" (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law 389 at 389.
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on Bear Stearns. However, Bear Stearns bailed them out due to reputational
concerns that the failure of such entities could raise concerns about the salety
and soundness of Bear Stearns itself.83 Such a bailout highlighted the concerns
about the indirect subsidization ofhedge funds by taxpayers through the parent
organization's access to the Federal Reserve discount window and an implicit
guarantee of a bailout of a too-big-to-fail parent company.
Such an opportunity for excessive risk taking stemming from indirect
subsidies means that hedge fund managers do not bear the entire costs and
consequences of their risk taking.sa To address that problem, the Dotkl-Frqnk
Act limits banking entities' investment in and sponsorship of hedge funds by the
introduction of the Volcker Rule. Indeed, the Volcker Rule limits the banks'
ability to invest the taxpayer-subsidized capital in hedge funds. Under this Rule,
it will be very unlikely that subsidized banks would rescue hedge funds.85
Even prior to the enactment of the Volcker Rule, mechanisms devised to
limit inappropriate transfer of government subsidies to unregulated entities were,
and still are, in place. These mechanisms include sections 234 and 238 of the
Federal Reserve Act.86 The provisions of the Federal Reserve At't on 'covered
transactions' were criticized on the grounds that the banking entity would have
nothing to gain from a below-market transfer of credit to a troubled afhliate.sT
However, the bailouts of hedge funds by their parent companies (banking
entities) in the recent global financial crisis proved otherwise. For example, Bear
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup each bailed out their internal hedge
funds just before their collapse.ss In the case of the systemically important Bear
Stearns, those bailouts contributed to its ultimate collapse.se
To prevent the transfer of government subsidies to speculative proprietary
trading, the Volcker Rule generally prohibits proprietary trading by banks and
their investment in private funds that are completely detached flom their
customer-serving activities.e0 In addition, the Rule prohibits banks from
82 Darrell Duffie, "The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks" (2010) 24 The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 5l [Duffie] at 59.
" Fo. a detailed overview of how the failure of the Bear Stearns hedge funds alfected thefirm, see William D Cohan, House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Èiccss o¡r
Wall Street (New York: First Anchor Books Edition, 2010) [Cohan].8a Dixon Lloyd et al., "Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk" (2012) online: Rand Corporation
< http://www.rand.org/contentidam/rand/pubs/monographs/20 I 2/
RAND_MGI 236.pdf > at 43, 65.
8s lbid.
86 Section 23A 12 U.S.C. $ l85l(Ð, which will be discussed below in sectiort (c). cntitled
"Prohibitions on'covered transactions"'.
87 Daniel R. Fischel et al., "The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies"
(1987)73 Virginia Law Review 301at326-327.
88 Duffie, supra îote82 at 59.
'n Cohon, supranoteS3.e0 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 56.
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guaranteeing obligations or performance of hedge funds and private equity
funds.er The following section of this article studies the provisions of the Volcker
Rule in detail and the third section will evaluate the success of the Volcker Rule
in achieving its objectives.
2. THE VOLCKER RULE: MAIN PROHIBITIONS
The prohibitions of the volcker Rule on proprietary trading and sponsorship
of private funds is reminiscent of the restrictions first introduced by the G/a,ss-
Steagall Act, which restricted commercial banks from engaging in high-risk and
,p."ulutiu" investment banking activities.e2 Commercial banking basically
involves taking deposits and lending. Although the sources of funding and the
methods of lending by commercial banks are varied, such functions remain the
core activities of commercial banks.n3 On the contrary, investment banking
involves activities, such as: underwriting (assisting fìrms in raising capital);
advisory services; mergers, acquisitions, and loan restructuring; trading and
brokerage services; and asset management services, including both traditional
and alternative asset management.e4
The Glass-Steagall wall standing between commercial and investment
banking activities proved to be the financial Maginot line rather than a
Chinese wall. It turned out to be easily penetrable, even before being torn down
by the Finqncial Moclernization Atl of 1999 (also known as the Grantnt'Leach'
Btiley Act (GLB).es In 1989, through section 20 subsidiaries, comrrercial banks
were allowed to underwrite corporate securities in a limited manner' The
enactment of the GLB, which started an era of reregulation of the fìnancial
industry within which commercial banks expanded their activities into securities
underwriting, drove the final nail into the coffin of the Gluss'Slaagall Act.
Indeed, at the end of the 20th century, investment banks could opcrate as they
did at the beginning of the century.e6 With the fall of the Glass-Steagall wall, the
er r2 u.s.c. g rs5l(dXlXcXv).
e2 Calomiris , supra note 48.e3 Giuliano lannotta, Investment Banking: A Guide to Underw'ititry and Advisot'l'^Ssrvlce.r
(Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2010) at l-2.
e4 lbid.
e5 In the last decades of the lgth century, commercial banks were increasingly entangled
with investment banking activities, which gave rise to concerns about conflicts of interest
within the banking industry. The first attempt to separate investment banking from
commercial banking was made in 1902 by a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency
according to which National Banks were prohibited from engaging in the investment
banking [usiness. However, in 1903, the First National Bank of Chicago circumvented
this rullng by creating its securities affiliate. With the approval of the Comptroller, this
method õf avoiding the ruling soon became widespread and comnrercial banks
effectively performeã investment banking business through their sectlrities affiliates.
See Morrison & Wilhelm lr, supra note 53 ar 196-197.
e6 lbid. atvüi.
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universal banking era began. Under the universal banking system, the bank, as
one legal entity, offered a full range of banking and non-banking financial
services.eT The services offered by universal banks include: financial
intermediation, providing payment facilities, liquidity provision (market
making), trading in financial instruments (including proprietary trading),
acting as brokers, offering advisory services, investment management, and
insurance services.es However, as suggested earlier, in the aftermath of the global
financial crisis, the logic of universal banking was questioned and proposals were
adopted that were reminiscent of the Glass-Steagall provisions.
This section studies the current regulatory instruments and innovations of
the Volcker Rule. In its current form, the Volcker Rule is viewed as a two-
pronged provision. [t introduces restrictions on proprietary trading, as well as
prohibitions on investments in and sponsorship of private funds by banking
entities. Then, this article studies the Rule's prohibition of proprietary trading.
Thereafter, it analyzes the Volcker Rule' prohibitions on investment in and
sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds by banking entities in light
of its stated objectives as well as theoretical and empirical fìndings.
(a) Prohibitions on proprietary trading
Proprietary trading offers attractive opportunities for banks in terms of
potential trading profits. It is reported that in 2004, 75'/o of the $6.7 billion of
Goldman's earnings before tax came from trading and investments.ee However,
the losses from proprietary trading played a role in putting LCFIs, such as
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Citigroup, at risk prior'
to the financial crisis.r00 In addition, mixing risky security holdings with
economically important flrnancial intermediation within banks was perceived as
one of the major causes of the recent hnancial crisis.l0l
n7 Heffernan,supra îote 44 at 19.
e8 lbid. One of the effects of the gradual erosion and final repeal of the Gløss-Stcugall Act
was the collapse olthe underwriting spreads for both equity and debt underwritings. This
was mostly attributed to the fact that the repeal of lhe Glass-Steagall Act allowed
commercial banks to enter into the securities-underwriting business and made r¡nder-
writing markets more competitive, which led to a reduction in underwriting spreads.
Since debt offerings are less information sensitive, they responded more rapidly to the
forces of competition emanating from the new entrants than equity offerings with higher
information sensitivity. See Morrison & Wilhelm Jr, ntpra note 53 'àt24-25.
ee Justin Fox, "Goldman: We Run Wall Street" CNNMoney (16 May 2005).
100 See R. Rex Chatterjee, "Dictionaries Fail; The Volcker Rule's Reliance on Definitions
Renders It Ineffective and a New Solution Is Needed To Adequately Regulate
Proprietary Trading" (2011) 8 Brigham Young University International Law &
Management Review 33 [Chatterjeel at 47-48. See also United States Government
Accountability Ofäce, "Proprietary Trading: Regulators Will Need More Comprehen-
sive Information to Fully Monitor Compliance with New Restrictions When Imple-
mented" (20 I I ), online: < http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/32 I 006.pdf > .r0' Acharya & Richardson , supra îote 4 at 7-8.
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The proprietary trading provisions of the Volcker Rule prohibit a banking
entityl02 from engaging in trading activities as a principal to profìt from the near-
term price movements. 103 A 'banking entity' is defined as "any insured
depository institution, lOa any company that controls an insured depository
institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of section
8 of the Internationql Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or subsidiary'o't of
any such entity."loó
The term 'proprietary trading' when used with respect to a banking e,ntity or
a Systemically Important Non-Bank Financial Company (SINBFC)r0t meant
"engaging as a principal for the trading accountrOs of [a] banking entity or [a
SINBFC] in any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose
of, any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a colnmodity for future
delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any other
r02 r2 u.s.c. g ls5l(hXt).
r03 l2 u.s.c. $ l85l(a) and (h)(4).
r0a An insured depository institution is defined in section 3 ofl the Fcdøal Deposir Insm'ont'e
Act (12 U.S.C. $ l8l3).
r05 Under sections 2(d) and 2(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act, the terms "subsidiary"
and "affiliate" are defined to include "any company that a bank holding company or
other company controls."
106 The definition of a "banking entity" in the Volcker Rule includes affiliates and
subsidiaries of a banking entity. Such a definition creates a circular definition that
subjects all advised funds of the banking entities, which are normally consiclered affiliates
of the bank, to the restrictions of the Volcker Rule. However, setting up an advisecl fund
is an explicitly permitted activity for banks. The potential inclusion of hcdgc funds and
private equity funds in the banking definition may have several unintended conse-
quences. Therefore, there is a need to exclude hedge funds and private equity f'unds from
the dehnition of a 'banking entity'. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, supt'o note
59 at 68-69.
r07 16. Dodd-Frank Act grants authority to the FSOC to determine whether a non-bank
financial company (which, among other things, includes hedge fttnds) is to be sttpervised
by the Federal Reserve (the Fed) and subject to the prudential standards. St¡ch a
determination must be made on a non-delegable basis and by a vote ol not fewer than
two-thirds of the voting members, including the affirmative vote of the Chairperson of
the FSOC. If the FSOC determines that the "material financial distress at the U.S. non-
bank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concenfration, interconnect-
edness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. non-bank financial company, could pose a
threat to the fînancial stability of the United States", it must subjcct the company to
prudential supervision by the Fed. See 12 U.S.C. $ 5323 (aXl). See also l2 C.F.R. $
1310.10.
lu8 The statute defines a'trading account'as
anv âccount used for acquirins or taking positions in the securities and instrumenls
deécribed in [the defìnitíon of proprietãry tracling] principally for the purpose of
selline in the àear term (or otheiwisè with the intent to resell in order to prolìt liom
short--term Þrice movements), and any such other accounts as the appropriate Federal
bankins aeencies. the lSeðurities ând Exchange Cotnmission (SE(')]. and the
[Comm-oditiy Futuies Trading Commission (CFTC)] may. by rule . . . determine.
r2 u.s.c. $ r85r(hx6).
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security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking agencies,
the [SEC], and the ICFTCI may . . . determine."roe
Since one of the core functions of a banking entity is maturity
transformation, banks have special cost-advantages in servicing loans to
households, small businesses, and other industrial sectors that cannot be easily
replicated outside the banking sector. In other words, the bank loans are not
substitutable. ll0 Meanwhile, other fìnancial institutions, such as hedge funds,
can easily undertake proprietary trading. Compared to banks, those linancial
institutions have lower leverage and do not have access to government safety
nets. Therefore, the Volcker Rule's prohibitions on proprietary trading can be
justified on the grounds that non-core banking activities can be undertaken in
less-systemically-important parts of the financial system.l I I
(i) Proprietary trading exceptions (Permitted activities)
Aside from the general ban on proprietary trading, the Volcker Rule
accommodates certain exceptions as 'permitted activities'.112 The permitted
activities mostly involve banking activities perceived to be ultimately benefìcial to
the broader economy and necessary for maintaining the safety and soundness of
banking institutions.r13 These permitted activities under the Volcker Rule
include market-making related activities, risk-mitigating hedging, underwriting,
and transactions on behalf of customers. lla
The main problem with these exceptions is distinguishing prohibited
activities from permitted activities. Although the 'bright line' proprietary
trading desks can be easily identified, under currently established banking
practices, significant proprietary trading activities can take place under the guise
of statutorily permitted activities.rr5 Therefore, eflectively distinguishing
prohibited activities from permitted activities can be at least as important as
establishing rules and supervisory frameworks aimed to prohibit proplietary
trading by banking entities across the board.
roe l2 u.s.c. $ l85l(hX4).
rr0 Eugene F. Fama, "What's Different about Banks?" (1985) l5 Journal ol Monetary
Economics 29.
rrr Acharya & Richardson , supra Íole 4 at 15.rr2 l2 u.s.c. $ l85l(dXl).
rr3 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 16-17.lla Further exemptions include transacting in government securities, certain insurance
activities, investments in small business investment companies, public welfare invest-
ments, certain qualified rehabilitation expenditures under federal or state tax laws,
certain offshore activities, and other activities that Agencies determine would promote
and protect the safety and soundness ofbanking entities and U.S. financial stability. See
l2 U.S.C. $ l85l(dXl). However, given the systemic importance and social value of the
market-making, hedging, underwriting and transaction on behalf of customers, this
paper only studies the impact of the Volcker Rule on such activities.
rl5 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra îote 59 at 4.
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The problem of distinguishing proprietary trading from permitted activities
is particularly acute in the cases of market making, hedging, underwriting, and
other transactions on behalf of customers. All these activities share similar
leatures with proprietary trading.tl6 In addition, the features of permitted
activities vary in different markets or asset classes, which pose an additional
challenge in making a distinction between the prohibited and permitted activities.
For example, the features of permitted activities in a liquicl equity sccurities
market may significantly differ from the features of permitted activities in an
illiquid over-the-counter derivatives market. I r7
Another challenge is that, as an unintended consequence, on the one hand,
broad restrictions on proprietary trading may deter permitted benefìcial activities
such as market making, hedging, and underwriting. On the other hand, loosely
defined restrictions can help banks circumvent those restrictions and engage in
prohibited proprietary trading activities. ll8 This section studies four items from
among the permitted activities because of their potential impact on raising funds
from the public, providing liquidity in the markets, internal risk management,
future banking business models, and their broader systemic implications. These
four items are: underwriting, market making, risk-mitigating hedging, and other
transactions on behalf of customers.
(l) Underwriting
Investment banks play a crucial role in mitigating inlormation problems in
financial markets.lle The crux of that role is mitigating information asymmetry
between issuers of securities and investors in those securities in initial public
offerings (IPOs).120 The extent of inlormation asymmetry between issuers and
investors is such that it may discourage investors from investing in securities
altogether.r2r To mitigate this information asymmetry, investment banks put
their own reputation on the line and signal to investors that the securities being
offered are of acceptable quality. The medium through which this function is
I f 6 Chatterjee, supra note 100 at 52-55.
f r7 Financial StabilityOversightCouncil, suproîote 59at 18.
tt8 lbid.
lle Fora seminal work on this, see Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, "lnformational
Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation" ( 1977) 32 Thc Journal
of Finance 37 I .
t2o Hafiz Hoque, "Role of Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard on IPO Under-
pricing and Lockup" (2014) 30 Journal of International Financial Markets, lnstitutions
and Money 81.
tzl 1¡ir is akin to the 'lemons problem' implying there is a significant likelihood ofl nrarket
failure due to information problems. Where the lemons problcm cxists, bad quality
drives out good quality and, in the end, the market for good quality proclttcts as well as
bad ones collapses. See George A. Akerlol "Thc Market lor "Lcnrons": Quality
Uncertaintyand the Market Mechanism" (1970) 84The Quarterly Journal of Economics
488.
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performed is 'underwriting', which is essential to facilitating equity and debt
issuance to raise capital.t22
However, the downside for investment banks is that underwriting basically
requires investment banks to assume principal risks, because underwriting, in
most cases, involves taking on the financial risk that the public offering might
not sell to investors.l23 The most common form of underwriting is known as
'firm commitment underwriting'. In this type of underwriting, an underwriter (or
a syndicate of underwriters) makes a commitment, in advance, to purchase a
defined number of securities issued by the company if they are not fully sold in
the public offering. Under such circumstances, underwriting firms themselves
sometimes intervene in the market in order to support the offered securities, an
intervention called stabilization.t2a Such intervention, by purchasing the
securities, to support them can hardly be distinguished from proprietary
trading.l25
(2) Market Making
Market making is another benehcial activity that is a permitted activity
under the Volcker Rule. Section 619 explicitly puts 'market making-related'
activities under the rubric of permitted activities, provided that they are
"designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term [sir] demands of
clients, customers or counterparties.o'126
Market making, akin to underwriting, requires taking principal risks.
However, the exposure to the risk while performing market making varies
widely. In 'agency' or'riskless principal' transactions, market making involves
either the market maker matching a buyer and a seller who afterwards transact
together, or securing commitments from both sides of the transaction, then
buying the financial instrument from the seller, and then selling it to the buyer.
This type of market making involves less risk and does not give rise to
opportunities for impermissible proprietary trading. 127 In contrast, market
making may involve 'principal transactions' in which market makers have to
commit capital to complete transactions. In principal transactions, in the absence
of a buyer or seller, the market maker assumes the role of a counterparty, which
requires a capital commitment and holding an inventory to provide liquidity to
the markets.r28 Such market-making activities are essential to liquidity and well-
't2 Jamer R Booth & Richard L Smith, "Capital Raising, Underwriting and The
Certification Hypothesis" (1986) I 5 Journal of Financial Economics 26 I .
123 Resort to stabilization mainly occurs in cases of firm commitment underwriting.
Otherwise, underwriting risks are shifted to the issuing company.
'to See Reena Aggarwal, "stabilization Activities by Underwriters after Initial Public
Offerings", (2000) 55 The Journal of Finance I 075.
f 25 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supro Íote 59 at2l-22.
r2u l2 U.S.C. g l35l(dXlXB). The same requiremenr applies ro underwriting.
127 Anne-Marie Anderson & Edward A. Dyl, "Market Structure and Trading Volume"
(2005),28 Journal ofFinancial Research I l5 at I 18.
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functioning financial markets, particularly in markcts tracling illiquid sccurities.
To mitigate the risks of such activities, the market maker may rcsort to dynamic
hedging practices.l2e Therefore, current practices in the markct-ntaking business
can be employed in a way that has the same effects as proprictary trading
does. l30
The inventory of securities held by a market maker to providc liquidity to the
markets can be built to engage in prohibited proprietary trading. Accorclingly,
one of the major challenges is that proprietary trading might be concealcd under
the guise of market-making operations.r3l Therefore, onc of the difficulties
regulators face in implementing the Volcker Rule is determining inventory levels
that are appropriate for providing liquidity to the markcts and lacilitating client-
driven transactions and distinguishing them from prohibited proprictary
transactions. 132
Therefore, the Volcker Rule's restrictions on proprietary trading and the
difficulty in distinguishing proprietary trading from market making activities
might, in practice, result in restrictions on banks' market-making activities,
thereby reducing liquidity in the secondary marketslrs and an exodus of market-
making activities to non-bank sectors, which can lead to increased systemic
risk.r3a Nevertheless, even if the prohibitions of the Volcker Rule result in
unintended restrictions on banking entities' market-making activities, it cannot
be viewed as just a negative consequence of the Volcker Rule. Some
commentators argue for more dispersed and diversified market-making
practices and institutions in financial markets,l-35 because liquidity becomes
most relevant in times of fìnancial distress when large fìnancial institutions and
dealers, who primarily engage in market-making activities, are not able to offer
market-making services. Therefore, it seems that the Volcker Rule can help
diversify the range of institutions that provide market-making services and,
hence, indirectly contribute to financial stability through laying the groundwork
for more robust liquidity-provision mechanisms in financial lnarkets.l16
r28 Jennifer L. Juergens & Laura Lindsey, "Getting out Early: An Analysis of Market
Making Activity at the Recommending Analyst's Firm" (2009), 64 The Journal ofl
Finance2327.
r2e Vishal Gaur & Sridhar Seshadri, "Hedging Inventory Risk Through Market lnstru-
ments" (2005),7 Manufacturing & Service Operation Management 103 [Gaur &
Seshadril.
r30 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supranote 59 at l8-19.
t3t lbid.
t32 Ibid.
r33 An¡an Thakor, "The Economic Consequences of the Volcker Rttle" (Sumnrer 2012),
U.S. Chamber of Commercie's Center for Capital Market Competitiveness I [Thakor].
l3a Darrell Duffie, "Market making under the proposed Volcker rule", (201 2) Rock Center
for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 106 I , at 2222.
r35 Acharya & Richardson , supra note 4 at 17.
136 Ibid.
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(3) Risk-mitigating hedging
Hedging is basically a risk-mitigating activity and a tool for risk
management. Therefore, it will be selfl-defeating for the Volcker Rule to
undermine the banking institutions' ability to engage in hedging activities. To
avoid such an outcome, the Volcker Rule accommodates an exception for risk-
mitigating hedging from its prohibition on proprietary trading activities.rrT
As stated above, market-making activities of investment banks often involve
building an inventory that requires holding positions in order to provide liquidity
to markets. However, holding such positions may expose the bank to outsized
market risks.l38 To address this problem, investment banks engage in risk-
management techniques, which help reduce their exposure to potential market
volatilities. Employing these techniques affects the banks' temporary positions
held in their inventory for market-making purposes. Ideally, the Volcker Rule
would not impede a banking entity's ability to engage in 'risk-mitigating hedging'
while simultaneously preventing it from engaging in prohibited proprietary
trading. However, since strategies employed by a banking entity to engage in
risk-mitigating hedging can be very similar to proprietary trading activities,
distinguishing such permitted activities from prohibited proprietary trading
activities presents another challenge to implementing the Volcker Rule. lle
In addition, hedging activities involve employing derivative instruments,
which may affect regulators' ability to identify the true purpose of a
transaction.lao If positions created to hedge do not correlate with the assets in
the inventory, or if a banking entity seeks to acquire an independent return by
employing hedging techniques, it can be assumed that these techniques are,
effectively, used to circumvent the prohibitions of the Volcker Rule. In order to
identify permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities from prohibited proprietary
trading activities, the hedging strategy of the banking entity should be clearly
defined and "directly related to an underlying set of fundamental risk factors to
which the entity is exposed".lal
Based on the nature of the risk and the amount of the exposure of financial
institutions, there are different methods of hedging financial risks. For example,
several market-making desks of a banking entity, which are exposed to similar
risk factors, may conduct their risk management on a portfolio basis, helping
them to better hedge the true exposures of the banking entity. However, linking
such a hedging strategy at the portfolio level to banking entities' trading
r37 l2 u.s.c. $ l85l(dXl).
'3t Gaur & Seshadri, supra note 129.l3e René M. Stulz, "should We Fear Derivatives?"(2004), l8 The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 173 at 184-185 (2004). (Highlighting transparency problems in the
derivatives markets and how disclosure requirements may not help to reflect the true
purposes of using such instruments).
rao Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at20-21.
tat Ibid.
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operations in a transparent manner can hardly be achieved and it is possible that
the prohibited proprietary trading could be masqueraded as portfolio hedging.ra2
Such opaqueness makes it difficult to distinguish hedging activities from
prohibited proprietary trading.ta3 In addition, to hedge a position, there needs
to be a commitment of principal risk. Such a commitment should be carefully
monitored to ensure that hedging activities are proportionately li¡rked to such
exposures, whereas comingling principal risks and others in one portfolio might
make such a determination very burdensome.laa
(4) Other transactions on behalf of customers
Within the ambit of the permitted activities also falls the "purchase, sale,
acquisition, or disposition of securities and other instruments . . . on behalf of
customers."la5 Such an exception to the Volcker Rule is intended not to impede a
bank's role in facilitating customer-driven transactions. It permits customer-
serving banking activities as opposed to speculative activities with the bank's
own capital.ta6 Under the Volcker Rule, prime brokerage services of banks fall
under this category of permitted activities. la7
(ii) Backstops or limits on the permitted activities
As stated above, in order not to interfere with the smooth functioning of
financial markets, the Volcker Rule exempts certain activities from the
application of its prohibitions. These permitted activities, which involve taking
principal risk, cover a range of activities that are incidental to core banking
functions.ra8 They include activities such as market making, underwriting,
hedging, transactions on behalf of customers, and transactions in governmcnt
securities. Nevertheless, these permitted activities themselves are subject to the
so-called'prudential backstops'.lae In other words, as part of its fällback
strategy, the Volcker Rule makes its exceptions subject to further exceptions.
The fìrst limit on permitted activities under the Volcker Rule involves
circumstances under which such permitted activities result in a material conflict
of interest between the banking entity and it clients, customers, or
ra2 David H. Carpenter & M. Maureen Murphy, "The Volcker Rule: A Legal Analysis"
(2014) Congressional Research Services l7 (2014).
ra3 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supranoLe 59 at20-21.
'aa Akshat Tewary, "Portfolio Hedging Is Alive and Well Under Volcker" American
Banker (30 December 30. 2013), online: American Banker < https:i/www.american-
banker.com/opinion/portfolio-hedging-is-alive-and-well-uncler-volcker > .
r45 l2 u.s.c. $ l85r(dXtXD).
ra6 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 22.
t47 lbid. at 57-59.
'oo For the definitions of enumerated and incidental powers of a bank, see generally Julie L.Williams & Mark P. Jacobsen, "The Business of Banking: Looking to the F-uture"
(1995), 50 The Business Lawyer at 783.
rae Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 47-48.
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counterparties. ls0 As mentioned earlier, addressing conflicts of interest was one
of the main driving forces motivating the introduction of the Volcker Rule in the
first place. Therefore, it would be self-defeating if the provisions of the Volcker
Rule, themselves, lead to a higher likelihood of conflicts of interest. Hence, if the
permitted activities under the Rule result in material conflicts of interest, they
shall no longer be permitted.l5l
The second important exception to the permitted activities concerns the
circumstances under which the permitted activity would directly or indirectly
result in a material exposure by the banking entity to high-risk assets or high-risk
trading strategies.r52 Since risk features of financial strategies and instruments
are dynamic and can change over time, the relevant regulatory agencies should
adopt flexible frameworks, rather than rigid defìnitions of 'high-risk assets' and
'high-risk trading strategies', with the focus being on the risks of an asset or
strategy that can lead to the failure of a banking entity or serious losses
thereto. 153 Since standards are more durable,l5a dynamic, flexible,ls5 and less
prone to regulatory arbitrage,ls6 in devising such a flexible approach, it is
important to make use of standards rather than rules.
In its report, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) presents a
number of non-exhaustive features that can be indicative of high-risk assets or
high-risk trading strategies.r5T These features include: rapidly growing new
products, assets and strategies with embedded leverage, historical volatility of the
asset or strategy, their value at risk (VaR), hard-to-value assets, assets whose
exposure cannot be quantified, risky assets whose risks cannot be adequately
hedged away, and assets with features that the application of capital and liquidity
standards cannot adequately account for their risks.l58
r50 l2 u.s.c. $ l85l(dX2XA).rsr r2 u.s.c. g r85r(dX2XAXi).
r52 l2 U.S.c. $ l85l(dX2XA)(ii). The Dodd-Frank lc¡ does nor define a high-risk asser or
high-risk trading strategy. Providing such definitions is to be done by the relevant
agencies.
r53 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 50-51.
l5a IsaacEhrlich&RichardA.Posner,"Aneconomicanalysisoflegalrulemaking"(1974),
3 The Journal of Legal 257 at 277 -2788 (197 4).
155 Hans-Bernd Schaefer, "Legal Rule and Standards" in Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich
Schneider, eds., The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, vol. I (Springer US, 2004) 347 at
3348, (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
I5u Doreen McBarnet, "Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal
Integrity and the Banking Crisis", in lain G. MacNeil & Justin O'Brien, eds., The Future
of Financial Regulation at 72 [McBarnet].
f 57 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supro note 59 at 50-51.
ls8 In order to assess the firm's exposure to high-risk assets or trading strategies, the report
further suggests that relevant regulators require banking entities to establish an expert
committee to appropriately assess such risks.
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The third statutory limitation on the Volcker Rule's perrnittcd activities
involves cases in which those activities would pose a threat to the safety and
soundness of a banking entity.r5e The fourth limit to the pelmitted activities is
that allowing these activities would result in a threat to US financialstability.r60
Although it seems unlikely that an activity that has ah'eady complied with the
above-mentioned prudential backstops, would pose a threat to US financial
stability, there might be concerns that an imbalance in the fìnancial system might
be created by a permitted activity that does not threaten the safety and soundness
of an individual fìnancial institution.16l In this case, regulatory agencies can
prohibit those activities that are initially permitted under the Volcker Rule.
For a SINBFC supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the Board), the Volcker Rule does not impose any restrictions on their
activities. However, it mandates the Board to adopt prudential rules, including
imposition of higher capital charges or other restrictions addressing potential
risks and conflicts of interest, to attain the objectives of the Volcker Rule.l62
(d) Restrictions on investment in hedge and private equity funds
A Large Complex Financial Institution (LCFI) can have at least three main
relationships with hedge funds. It can be a hedge fund's prime broker, its trading
counterparty, andfor its owner or manager. These three main roles are not
mutually exclusive, and one single LCFI can simultaneously undertake all three
tasks.163 The greatest concern about this interconnectedness arises when those
three roles overlap and are concentrated in one LCFL FoT ycars, depository
institutions used to be involved in alternative investments and providing various
services to hedge funds. Among other things, banking entities used to extend
credit to hedge funds, act as their intermediaries and counterparties, manage
their assets, invest in hedge funds, act as their prime brokers and custodians of
their assets, and even establish hedge funds for themselves (known as banks'
proprietary trading desk). róa
Despite their benefits, hedge funds can potentially pose risks to financial
systems and contribute to financial instability. Although their role in fìnancial
r5e r2 u.s.c. $ r85r(dX2XAXiii).
r60 l2 u.s.c. g l85t(dX2XAXiv).
f 6r Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra îote 59 at 52. ln adclition, to protect the
safety and soundness ofbanking entities, the Volcker Rule requires regulators to inrpose
additional capital requirements and quantitative limitations. Nevertheless, the Volcker
Rule should not be construed to limit the ability of a banking entity or a non-bank
financial company supervised by the Fed to sell or securitize loans.
ru2 l2 u.s.c. o r85r(aX2).
r63 Michael R. King & Philip Maier, "Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating
Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks" (2009), 5 Journal of Financial Stability 283
at290.
'uo J. S. Aikman, When Prime Brokers Fail: The Unheeded Risk to Hedge Funds, Banks,
and the Financial Industry (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2010) at 126-12l .
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instability is highly contested, ró5 hedge funds' size, leverage, their
interconnectedness with LCFIs, and the likelihood of herd behavior among
hedge funds are among the features that can make them systemically
important.l66 The data on hedge funds'sizet6T and leveragel6s shows that
these features are far from being systemically important. Nevertheless, empirical
evidence on hedge fund interconnectedness and herding behavior (e.g., a run on
prime brokers) is mixed and remains a major concern for regulators. l6e
Therefore, among other things, systemic risk originating from the connectivity
of the hedge fund industry to the banking industry as a ground for regulatory
interventionrT0 equally provides a rationale for public policy intervention in the
hedge fund industry. However, regulation of hedge funds due to their systemic
importance should focus on hedge fund interconnectedness with LCFIs.lTl
The Volcker Rule is an attempt to indirectly regulate hedge funds through
direct regulation of the banks that often perform the role of hedge fund
l6s Nicolas Papageorgiou & Florent Salmon, "The Role of Hedge Funds in the Banking
Crisis: Victim or Culprit", in Greg N. Gregoriou ed., Tlte Banking Crisis Hqndbook
(Florida: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010).
166 Consistent with the industry's modest size, hedge flund liquidation had, overall, a very
limited impact on financial markets. Ben S. Bernanke, "Hedge Funds and Systenric
Risk" (delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets
Conference) [Bernanke]. See also Anurag Gupta & Bing Liang, "Do Hedge Funds have
Enough Capital? A Value-at-Risk Approach", (2005) 77 Journal of Financial
Economics 219 [Gupta & Liang] (illustrating that the leverage of hedge funds is
significantly lower than that of depository institutions, listed investment banks, and
broker-dealers). See also Nicole M. Boyson et al., "Hedge Fund Contagion and
Liquidity Shocks", (20 1 0) 65 The Journal of Finance I 789 [Boyson et a/.].
167 The data on hedge fund size demonstrates its relatively modest size compared to
mainstream financial institutions. Estimates of the size of the hedge fund industry in
March2012 indicated that the hedge fund industry's assets under management (AUM)
amounted to $2.55 trillion. See Citi Prime Finance, "Hedge Fund Industry Snapshot",
Citi Prime Finance (May 2013), online: < http://www.citigroup.com/icg/global-mar-
kets/prime_finance/docs/hf_monthlyjun l3.pdf > . According to the latest HFR Clobal
Hedge Fund Industry Report, hedge fund capital was $2.90 trillion in the lourth quarter
of 2015. See HFR Global Hedge Fund Industry Report: Year End 2015 (January 20,
2016). Consistent with the industry's modest size, hedge fund liquidation had, overall,
very limited impact on financial markets. See Bernanke, supra note 166.
r68 SeeGupta&Liang,supranotel66.SeealsoAndrewAngetal.,"HedgeFundLeverage",
(2011) 121 Journal of Financial Economics 102.
r6e Boysone/ al.,supra note l66at 1814. SeeWilliam Fung& David A. Hsieh, "Mcasuring
the market impact of hedge funds" (2000), 7 Journal of Empiral Finance I (providing
evidence of hedge fund herding in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
crisis and in the Asian Crisis; however, they found little evidence of a systematically
causal relationship of hedge funds behavior and a deviation of market prices from
economic fundamentals).
170 For more details about why systemic risks and their associated externalities should be
regulated, see Brunnermeier et al., supra note 6.
r7r Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 8.
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counterparties, creditors, sponsors, investors, or prime brokers. Subject to
certain exceptions, the Rule prohibits depository institutions from engaging in
proprietary trading and investing in or sponsoring hedge funds and private
equity funds. The primary goal of this provision is to prohibit the banking system
from speculative trading with the banks' own capital, mitigate the potential
conflicts of interest between a banking entity and its customers, and reduce the
risks to the banks and non-bank flrnancial companies designated as SINBFCs
that are subject to supervision by the Board.l72
The Volcker Rule's provisions relating to hedge funds and private equity
funds prohibit a banking entity from investing in, or having certain relationships
with, hedge funds and private equity funds as defined under the exclusions ofthe
Investment Company Act of 1940.t73 These restrictions prohibit a banking entity
from acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest
in, or sponsoring, a hedge fund or a private equity funcl.lTa The Volcker Rule's
prohibitions on investment in hedge funds and private equity funds and its
prohibitions on proprietary trading basically share the same objectives. Namely,
not only do these restrictions intend to eliminate federal support for the
speculative investing strategies of banking entities with theit own capital, but
they also intend to reduce the conflicts of interest between a banking entity and
its customers. In the meantime, they strive to reduce the risk to banking entities
and SINBFCs supervised by the Board.r75
As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives of the Volcker Rule is to restrict
the cross-subsidization of private funds by the taxpayer money through
depository institutions. Banks are often afforded an explicit two-pronged
safety net. The first component of the US system of safety nets is the banking
system's access to the LOLR facilities of the Federal Reserve. The second
component is deposit insurance, which is provided by the federal government to
prevent runs on the member banks. 176 In addition, there is an implicit or cle /ac.to
safety net for banks that are deemed to be too-big-to-fail, too-interconnected-to-
fail, or too-correlated-to-fail.r77 Ultimately, these safety nets are partially funded
by taxpayer money to sustain the essential role of banks in providing credit and
offering payment services. 178 By imposing restrictions on the banking entities'
investment in hedge funds and private equity funds, the Volcker Rule aims to cut
the transfer of such subsidies from banks to private funds.
172 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 15.
173 The Investment Company Act of 1940,15 U.S.C. g 80a- I el seq.
r74 r2 u.s.c. g l85l(aXlXB).
r75 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 56.
176 Calomiris & White, supranoteT6.
r77 El¡ah Brewer, III & Julapa Jagtiani, "How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-
To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?" (2013) 43 Journal of Financial Services
Research I [Brewer & Jagtiani].
r78 Malysheva & Walter, supra note 66.
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On the other hand, as with proprietary trading, the sponsorship of hedge
funds and private equity funds can be a potential source of risk and liquidity
stress to banks. Out of reputational concerns, a banking entity might rescue a
failing sponsored fund or a failing fund that it advises. Such support for failing
hedge funds was well documented in the recent global financial crisis. lTe
Moreover, the complexities involving in investment in hedge funds and private
equity funds and the inherent opaqueness of those funds limit market
participants' ability to properly monitor the risks to the banking entities
sponsoring such funds. Such opaqueness can create more uncertainty about the
safety and soundness of the financial institutions sponsoring or having
significant investments in private funds. 180
In line with addressing concerns about cross-subsidization of hedge funds
through transfer of government subsidies to speculative proprietary trading, the
Volcker Rule generally prohibits investment by banks in hedge and private
equity funds that are completely detached from their customer-serving
activities.rsrThe goal is achieved by the use of the broad language of the
Volcker Rule, which stipulates that a banking entity shall not "acquire or retain
any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund
or a private equity fund."l82
The aim of the Volcker Rule's restrictions on a banking entity's investment
or sponsorship of hedge funds that are not related to the provision of "bona fide
trust, fìduciary, or investment advisory services" to its customers is manifold.
Since a banking entity's investment in or sponsorship of hedge funds can be used
to circumvent the Volcker Rule's restrictions on proprietary trading, such a
prohibition on hedge fund sponsorship ensures that banks will not be able to
circumvent proprietary trading prohibitions by investing in hedge funds and
private equity funds. The second objective is to limit the scope of private fund-
related activities of banking entities to customer-related services, 183 such as prime
brokerage activities. Another objective is also to eliminate the contingencies in
which banking entities might bail out the funds they advise, sponsor, or
significantly invest in out of reputational concerns.l84
Under the Volcker Rule, a hedge fund or a private equity fund is an issuer
that would be an investment company, as defìned inthe Investtnent Compcut)t Act
of 1940185 but for section 3(cXl) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or such similar funds as
r7e Duffie, supra note 82 at 59.
r80 Financial Stability Oversight Council, suprø note 59 at 56.
t8t lbid.
r82 l2 u.s.c. g t85l(aXtXB).
183 For a definition of a 'customer' and its difference from a 'client'and the problems arising
from the need for a clear definition of these terms with respect to the Volcker Rule, see
Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 63-64.
t&a lbid. at 6-7.
r85 l5 u.s.c. Boa-l et seq.
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the appropriate federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) may determine.rs6 Therefore, hedge funds and private equity funds
are defined to include any issuer that relies on the exemptions ol the definition of
investment company under sections 3(cXl) or 3(cX7) of the ,lvssf nrcnt Cotnpany
Act.tg7 According to the Investment Company Ac't'oan issuer that is not making
and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities and
either (i) has outstanding securities that are beneficially owned by not more than
one hundred persons or (ii) has outstanding securities that are owned exclusively
by qualified purchasers" is excluded from the definition of investment
company. 188 Along with hedge funds, a large number and variety of other
legal entities use the exemptions from the Investment Contpany l¿'1. These entities
include special purpose acquisition vehicles, certain ERISA-qualifìed employee
pension funds,lse controlled subsidiaries, certain joint ventures, and, at least
potentially, certain venture capital funds.le0
There are major problems with the dehnitions of a hedge fund and a private
equity fund under the Volcker Rule. The first and foremost is that the definition
is both over- and under-inclusive. Therefore, the prohibitions of the Volcker
Rule might include funds that were not intended to fall under the regulatory
purview of the Rule. In other words, not all investment funds traditionally
considered to be hedge funds or private equity funds rely on the exemptions set
forth in section 3(c)(l) or 3(cX7) of the Investment Cotnpan), Act.It is possible to
create investment funds that rely on other exemptions of the Inveslmøú Company
Act that do not fall within the defìnition of hedge funds and private equity funds,
but such funds may pursue the same strategies as hedge funds and private equity
funds do. These funds might not be captured by the Volcker Rule's definitions.
For example, commodity pools that do not mainly invest in financial instruments
fall into in this category.rer
The potential challenge to the definitions in the Volcker Rule is that
"defìnitions and criteria involving clear rules or thresholds make particularly
r86 r2 u.s.c. g 1851(hX2).
r87 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 57.
r88 l5 u.s.c. g 8oa-3(c).
f te ERISA, supranore63.
reo Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 6l -63.
lel The under-inclusiveness of the definition is partly addressed by the grant of congres-
sional authority to regulators to bring 'similar funds' within the scope of the Volcker
Rule. In determining which funds should be included in the category ofl similar funds,
regulators should consider the investment activities and other features of the fund,
including its compensation structure, trading and investment strategy, use of leverage,
and investor composition. Indeed, the statutory exemptions set forth in lhe Invcstnrcnt
Company Act do not apply exclusively to hedge lunds and private equity funds.
Therefore, the criteria for delineating the exceptions of the Volcker Rule remain to be
determined by future rule making. Ióld
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valuable material for legal engineers to work otr",le2 which can potcntially lead
to regulatory arbitrage. In addition to the inherent indeterminacy in language, le''
the prospective generalizations, which are the necessary featurcs of law, le4 arc
another source of indeterminacy and vagueness in statutory defìnitions. This
limited linguistic ability, coupled with problems of interpretation, brced
opportunities in which technical compliance with rules and regulations can be
achieved while undermining their underlying spirit and the purposc on which the
entire regulatory system or a speciflrc law is predicated. Compliance of this sort,
dubbed 'creative compliance', which essentially involves "using the law to cscapc
legal control without actually violating legal rules",les is well documcnted in
regulatory literature. le6
Likewise, rules-based direct regulation of hedge funds, along with thc appcal
to the literal meaning of words in adjudication and legal interpretation, can be
used to undermine the very purpose of the Volcker Rule. As history suggests,
hedge fund regulation was not an exception to this general rule and evcn the
earliest attempts to regulate hedge funds were smothered by dcfinitional
problems, exemplified by the US District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Goldstein v. SEC.teT Therefore, regulatory arbitrage
concerns stemming from definitional problems remains a major concern.
The prohibitions of the Volcker Rule on banking entities' relationships with
hedge funds are not in the form ofgeneral and outright bans; they also have their
exceptions. A banking entity is allowed to organize and offer a fund in
connection with its bona fide trust, fiduciary, and investment advisory
services. le8 In addition, banking entities are allowed to invest in hedge funds
and private equity funds up to a de minimis amount. lee These exemptions enable
banking entities to establish start-up funds and attract investors in connection
with their customer-related businesses. The next section studies these exceptions.
(äi) Permitted Activities
The Volcker Rule excludes certain activities from the broad prohibitions on
investment in hedge funds and private equity funds by banking entities. The
f ?2 McBarnet, supra note 156.
re3 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Lat,3rd ed. (Great Britain: Oxford University Press,
1994) at 126 ç 2.
f ea Joseph Raz, The Autlrcrity of Latv: Essays otr Lav, antl Morality (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979) at 214-218.
le5 D. McBarnet & C. Whelan, "The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle
for Legal Control" (1991), 54 Modern Law Review 848.
leu See Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (Oregon: Hart
Publishing, 2004).
'n7 See Goldstein v. SEC,45l F.3d 873 at 884 (D.C. Cir., 2006) and the battle over the word'client'.
re' l2 u.s.c. $ l85l(dXlXG).
tee Ibid.
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underlying philosophy of the 'permitted activities' is that banking entities in
general play an important role in providing financial services, including
providing bona fìde trust, fiduciary and investment advisory services. When
banking activities, which are related to hedge fund and private equity funds,
support customer-focused advisory services of the banking entity, they should be
allowed. In general, a banking entity is allowed to organize, offer, or invest in a
hedge fund or private equity fund if:
l. the banking entity provides bona fìde trust, fìduciary, or investment
advisory services;
2. the fund is organized and offered only in connection with the provision
of bona fìde trust, fiduciary, or investment advisory services and only to
persons who are customers of such services of the banking entity;
3. the banking entity does not acquire or retain an equity interest,
partnership interest, or other ownership interest in the fund except for
a de minimis investment;
4. the banking entity complies with the restrictions that ban the banking
entity and its subsidiaries from entering into covered transactions (which
are broadly defined as transactions with or involving affìliates) under
specifrrc circumstances;
5. the banking entity does not, directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or
otherwise insure the obligations or performance of the hedge fund or
private equity fund or ol any hedge fund or private equity fund in which
such a hedge fund or private equity fund invests;2oO
Under the Volcker Rule, a banking entity can offer prime brokerage services
to hedge funds or private equity funds in which affiliated hedge funds of the
banking entities have taken interest subject to the'arm's length' requirements of
the sections 238 of the Federal Reserve Act. ln other worcls, since offering prime
brokerage services is neither considered as sponsoring nor investing in hedge
200 Further restrictions include;1. the banking entity does not share the same name or a
variation of the same name with the hedge fund or private equity fund;2. no director or
employee ofthe banking entity takes or retains an equity interest, partnership interest, or
other ownership interest in the hedge fund or private equity fund, except for any clirector
or employee of the banking entity who directly engages in providing investment advisory
or other services to the hedge fund or private equity fund;3. the banking entity discloses
to prospective and actual investors in the fund, in writing, that any losses in such hedge
funds or private equity funds are borne solely by investors in the funds and not by the
banking entity, and otherwise complies with any additional rules of the appropriate
federal banking agencies, the SEC, or the CFTC, designed to ensure that losses in such
hedge funds or private equity funds are borne solely by investors in the funds and not by
the banking entity; and4. certain other conditions including the banking entity's
compliance with the restrictions on 'covered transactions' uncler Sections 234 and 238 of
the Federal Reserve Act are met. See l2 U.S.C. $ l85l(dXlXG).
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funds, by no means does the Volcker Rule prohibit a banking entity from
offering prime brokerage services to independent hedge funds and private equity
funds.20l
(iv) De Minimis Investments
As one of the exceptions to the Volcker Rule, taking or retaining a 3o/o or
lower de minimis investment in a hedge fund or private equity fund that the
banking entity organizes or offers in connection with bona fide trust, fìduciary
and investment advisory lunctions is permitted subject to certain limitations and
conditions.2o2 The amount of the de minimis investment must be immaterial to
the banking entity and may, at most, comprise up to 3'/o of the total ownership
interest of such a fund following an initial one-year seeding period; namely, after
one year from the establishment of the fund. Within the one-year seeding period,
the banking entity is allowed to provide up to 100% of the capital of a hedge
fund or a private equity fund it sponsors.203 However, the aggregate of all the
interests of the banking entity in all hedge funds and private equity funds should
not exceed 3o/, of the Tier I capital of the banking entity.204
Moreover, the Volcker Rule's authorization of de minintis investments in
hedge funds and private equity funds is subject to another constraint. The
amounts of the banking entity's investment in hedge funds must be deducted
from the banking entity's capital. Such deductions must be fulther increased in
proportion to the leverage of the fund.205 Last but not least, to prevent conflicts
of interest, particularly within the scope of the de minintis exception, such
investments must be in connection with the customer-related activities.206
201 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 57-59.
202 The first condition to be met is that such an investment should be for the purposes of
establishing the fund and the second is that the investment should be a dc ntininús
investment. l2 U.S.C. $ l85l(dX4XA).
203 r2 u.s.c. $ rs5r(dX4XBXiÐ(r).
204 l2 U.S.C. $ l85l(dX4XBXiiXII). In rhe lirsr proposed bill to the Congress, there was an
outright ban on such investments. However, the first political compromise allowed
banking entities to invest up to 3% of their tangible common equity in hedge lunds or
private equity funds. Tangible common equity consists of shareholder equity and is
perceived as the strongest form of a bank's capital. However, such a proposal faced
strong resentment from the industry, which resulted in another amendment. That
amendment changed the 3% of tangible common equity to 3% ofTier I capital, the scope
of which is much broader than that of tangible common equity. See Shahien Nasiripour,
"Financial Reform Bill Passes: Banks Keep Derivatives Units, Volcker Rr¡les Sofltened;
House-Senate Conference Passes Financial Reform Bill After Marathon Session", ftc
Huffington Post (25 June 20I0), online: < http://www.huffingtonpost.conI20I0106I25I
fînancial-reform-bill-pas_n_625l9l.html > .
205 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra îote 59 at 65-67.
206 lbicl.
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(e) Prohibitions on'covered transactions'
The Volcker Rule further prohibits a banking entity that serves as an
investment manager, an adviser, or a sponsor to a hedge fund or private equity
fund and any affiliate ofsuch an entity from entering into a'covered transaction'
as defined in Section 23A ol the Fecleral Reserve Ae't.2o7 A 'covered transaction'
includes making loans, purchasing assets, extending guarantees, etc.2o8 Section
l85l (Ð(2) of the Volcker Rule requires that no banking entity or its affìliates that
invests or sponsors a hedge fund or private equity fund may enter into a
transaction with the fund or its affiliates that would be a coverecl transaction. 20e
Therefore, the second condition imposed on the permitted activities of
banking entities in connecting with investing in heclge funds and private equity
funds is that such activities should be subject to the requirements of section 23A
of the Federql Reserve Act, which imposes strict qualitative and quantitative
restrictions on 'covered transactions' between a banking entity and an affiliate.
Section 234 includes two quantitative and two qualitative rules:
l. A bank's total covered transactions with a single affìliate must not
exceed l0'/o of the bank's total capital.
2. The total amount of the bank's covered transactions with all affiliates
combined must not exceed 20o/, of the bank's capital.
3. Any extension of credit must be fully secured by the qualifying collateral.
The value of the collateral must be between 100% and 130% of the
amount of the covered transactions.
4. A bank cannot purchase a low-quality asset from an affìliate.
In addition, section 238 imposes an 'arm's length' requirement on the terms
of any transaction between a banking entity that organizes, offers, or sponsors a
hedge fund or private equity fund or that acts as an investment manager or
adviser to the hedge or private equity fund. The arm's length requirement means
that these transactions must be concluded on market terms and conditions.
Therefore, virtually none of the financial transactions between an insured
depository institution and an affrliate can be on terms more favourable than
market terms. Such restrictions are particularly effective in reducing the
likelihood of conflicts of interest and transfer of the benefits of banks' deposit
insurance and the safety net from insured depository institutions to hedge
funds.2lo
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, many private equity funds, foreign investment
funds, and commodity funds could avoid being treated as an affìliate because
207 l2 u.s.c. $ ts5t(t).
208 l2 C.F.R. $ 223.3(h) (also known as Regularion W).
2oe l2 u.s.c. $ t85l(fXl).
2r0 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at 67-68.
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they were not considered a registered investment company under the ltneslment
Company Act, and hence were not deemed to be an affiliate for the purposes of
sections 23A and 238 of the Federal Reserve Act.2tt In other words, the
prohibitions of sections 234 and 238 of the Federctl Reserve Act on the banking
entities did not deem all hedge funds and private equity funds sponsored by a
banking entity to be afflrliates of the banking entity. Nonetheless, after the
introduction of the Volcker Rule, all hedge funds and private equity funds
offered, advised, or sponsored by a banking entity are subject to stricter
restrictions.2l2
Another permitted activity for a banking entity under the Volcker Rule
concerns the establishment of feeder funds, where it is necessary for the banking
entity in connection with its customer-focused advisory services to provide
customers with access to third-party hedge funds or private equity funds by
establishing funds that invest in third-party funds. Organization of such funds is
justifìed because in such a structure the risks associated with feeder funds are
entirely borne by the investors in those funds and do not pose any risk to the
banking entity itself.2l3 Nonetheless, there might be concerns about conflicts of
interest if a banking entity "directs a feeder fund or fund of fund investment to a
third-party hedge fund or private equity fund with which the banking entity has
other business relationshipr."'to
To avoid such circumstances, regulators should be particularly keen to
ensure the banking entity's business activities with third-party funds complies
with the Volcker Rule's prohibition of the 'covered transactions' (e.g., "making
loans, purchasing assets and extending guarantees") and the restrictions that
section 238 of the Federal Reserve Act's'aÍm's length' transaction requirement
impose on such business relationships. In addition, regulators should ensure that
such arrangements do not create opportunities for banking entities to protect
hedge funds or private equity funds from losses or to bail them out in case of
distress. Furthermore, they should also ensure that such arrangements do not
give rise to contingencies in which the banking entity might be exposed to
outsized risks by those funds.2l5
(Ð Limits on permitted activities
As with the limitations on permitted activities under the proprietary trading
provisions, the Volcker Rule provides limitations on permitted activities under
the provisions prohibiting certain business relationships between banking entities
and hedge funds. Indeed, the same statutory 'backstops' for the permitted
2l I Even such funds were covered by these provisions, if the banking entity ownecl nrore than
5%o of the fund's capital.
212 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra îote 59 at 67-68.
213 lbid. at 64-65.
2t4 Ibid.
2ts lbid.
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activities with respect to proprietary trading also apply to the pelmitted activities
under the provisions limiting the business relationship between a banking entity
and a hedge fund or private equity fund. These statutory backstops involve
circumstances under which the permitted banking entity's relationships with
hedge funds and private equity funds result in material conflicts of interest,
material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies, a threat to
the safety and soundness of the banking entity, or a threat to US fìnancial
stability.2r6
3. AN EARLY ASSESSMENT
The prohibitions of the Volcker Rule on proprietary trading and banking
entities' investment and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds
pursue three main objectives: addressing problems arising from the
interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs; preventing cross-subsidization
of hedge funds by their parent depository institutions with the access to explicit
and implicit government guarantees; and mitigation of conflicts of interest in the
relationship between banks, their customers, and hedge funds. In addition to
protecting investors and taxpayers' money, the Volcker Rule should also avoid
putting US banks_ at a competitive disadvantage in global markets dominatcd by
universal banks.2l7 It is clear that achieving all of these often-competing
objectives is the greatest challenge to implementing the Volcker Rule. Thercfore,
the Rule's success or failure must be evaluated against the goals it scts to achieve
at the lowest cost to market efficiency and competitiveness of US fìnancial
institutions.
In terms of achieving these objectives, the Volckel' Rule can only bc partially
successful: the first reason being that it is the product of political compromises
made to pass the legislation. Indeed, Paul Volcker himself is quotcd as saying
that the bill containing the Volcker Rule "went from what is bcst to what could
be passed" in the process of its enactment.2ls The most striking of these
compromises is best depicted in the extensive exceptions to thc Volcker Rule,
which allegedly made it toothless.2le These exceptions even convinccd Paul
Volcker himself that the success of the Volcker Rule depends much on the way it
will be implemented.22o
In addition to political compromises, one of the key aspects of the
implementation of the Volcker Rule relies on the regulators' ability to
2r6 l2 u.s.c. $ ls5l(dX2).
217 Alison K. Gary, "Creating A Future Economic Crisis; Political F'ailure ancl the
Loopholes of the Volcker Rule", (2012) 90 Oregon Law Review 1339 [Gary] ar l-350.2r8 Louis Uchitelle, "Volcker Pushes for Reform, Regretting Past Silence" The New york
Times,(l0July20l0),online: <http://www.nytimes.comi20l0107/ll/business/llvolck-
er.html?pagewanted : all&_r : 0 > [Uchitelle].2te Gary, supra note 217 at 1349.
220 Uchitelle, supra note 218.
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distinguish permitted activities from prohibited ones. The problem of
distinguishing such activities ultimately boils down to definitional problems.22r
Indeed, there is ample need for defìnitions in implementing the Volcker Rule. For
example, the Rule allows banking entities to offer organized or sponsored funds
only to 'customers' of a banking entity.z2z In this respect, there is a need for a
dehnition of the word 'customer' in way that does not allow all of its clients and
counterparties to take advantage of the term 'customer'. Moreover, the de
minimis exception applies in two cases. It is applied "to restrict the exposure of a
banking entity to 3o/o of any single fund" and also to limit the banking entity's
aggregate exposure to 3% of its Tier I capital.223 Ineither case, calculating the r/c
mínimis investment will pose a challenge for the regulators.
Therefore, future dehnitions of the key terms in the Volcker Rule will play a
major role in minimizing the risk of its evasion. The question, which as yet
remains unanswered, is whether regulators will be able to create mechanisms to
distinguish prohibited activities from permitted activities that share common
features. Given that regulators already tried and failed - to appropriatelydefine 'proprietary trading' in 2005, and have since come to the conclusion that
preventing proprietary trading requires a subjective, case-by-case evaluation,22a
any future definitions might fare no better. Since such assessments will
undoubtedly require many case-by-case analyses of the various banking
entities' activities, it is not yet known what the costs of such assessments will
be in practice. It also remains to be seen what the public policy response will be
should the costs of such case-by-case assessments exceed their benefìts.
Moreover, it is important not to allow prohibited activities to occur
throughout the entire banking entity and not just within its certain units.
Effective regulation should prevent banking entities from relocating their
proprietary trading activities from their existing proprietary trading desks to
other operational units. Thus far, major banks have already spun off or closed
down their standalone 'bright line proprietary trading' businesses.22-t However,
221 For example, one of the concerns about the Volcker Rule is related to its unintended
consequences with respect to the definitions regarding the terms 'hedge fund', 'private
equity fund', 'proprietary trading', 'market making', 'hedging', and 'customer-driven
transactions'. Inappropriate definitions ofsuch terms might have adversc consequences
on financial institutions, particularly on their liquidity management. For similar
concerns regarding definitional problems, see Douglas J. Elliott & Christian Rauch,
"Lessons from the Implementation of the Volcker Rule lor Banking Structural Reforn
in the European Union" (2014) Center of Excellence SAFE White Paper Series No. 13.
"2 2 u.s.c.$ l85r (dxrXGXii).
223 l2 U.S.C. $ 1851(dX4XBXiiXII). See also Financial Stability Oversight Council, srrpla
note 59 at 6-7.
224 Sabel Bradley, "General Accountability Olfice Struggles with Dodd-Frank's Volcker
Rule" Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
(26 August 201l), online: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and
Financial Regulation <http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgovl20lll0S126lgeneral-ac-
countability-office-struggles-with-dodd-franks-volcker-rule/ > .
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such activities might well migrate to other divisions in the investment banks. To
prevent such evasion (i.e., regulatory arbitrage either by the banks or by the
hedge funds), the Volcker Rule gives regulatory agencies extensive powers both
in rule making and in implementing the Volcker Rule.226
In addition to definitional problems, which might undermine the attainment
of the objectives of the Volcker Rule in terms of addressing interconnectedness,
the Rule's success depends, to a great extent, on its future implementation by
regulatory agencies. For example, one of the provisions of the Volcker Rule
containing an exception, which is considered a large loophole, involves
permitting de minimis investment by banking entities in a hedge fund up to
3o/o of bank's Tier I Capital.227 Though essential for the viability of the hedge
fund and private equity fund industry, banks and hedge funds can potentially
exploit this exception. Moreover, the Volcker Rule's authorization for a banking
entity to serve as a general partner, managing member, or trustee of a hedge
fund, or to hold, subject to certain conditions, a controlling interest in a hedge
fund,228 can be seen as another potential loophole that banks and hedge funds
can exploit, with the likely end result of putting banking entities at risk.
Although it is suggested that an outright prohibition on banks' involvement in
hedge funds is the best way to prevent losses to the banking entity,22e such a
general ban might result in a loss of the benefìts that hedge lunds deliver to
banks, and vice versa.
Another criticism to the Volcker Rule is that it might give rise to certain
unintended consequences. For example, in response to the Rule, some activities
may move to the shadow banking sector because of increased regulatory costs to
banks.230 Although preventing banking entities from engaging in proprietary
trading by subsidized funds is the very objective of the Volcker Rule, as an
unintended consequence, the Rule can inadvertently shift proprietary trading
activities away from regulated banks to more lightly-regulated non-banks.23l
Furthermore, it is likely that any exodus of proprietary trading might move
such trading away from US banks to non-US banks and fìnancial institutions,
particularly if, compared to other principal financial jurisdictions, the costs of
225 Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 59 at l7- 18.
226 Nonetheless,theDodcl-FrankActingeneral andtheVolckerRuleinparticularhavebeen
criticized for delegating too many details to regulatory agencies.
227 t2 u.s.c.$ r85 l(dX4XBXiÐ(rr).
228 l2 u.s.c. g r85r(dXlXG).
22e Gary, supra note 217 at 1362.
230 ÍnciÖtker-Robeetal.,"lmpactofRegulatoryReformsonLargeanclComplexFinancial
Institutions" The International Monetary Fund (3 November 201 0), online: < https:i/
www.imf.org/external/pubs lfr.lspnl20l0lspnl0l6.pdf > , IMF Staff Position Note 26.
23r Charles K. Whitehead, "The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets" (2011), I
Hazrvard Business Law Review 39. This is what happened to the Volcker Rule's
predecessor (i.e., the G/ass-Steagall Act\which ultimately led to its demise. See Acharya,
et al., supra note 69 at 368-370.
338 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [32 B.F.L.R.]
implementing the Volcker Rule for regulated frrms exceed the potential benefits
that such regulation can offer. tn this case, at least at first blush, it seems that the
costs far outweigh the benefìts to banking institutions.2" Ho*euer, such
concerns are at least partially ameliorated because in the wake of the global
hnancial crisis, most shadow banks, including hedge funds, became subject to
heavier regulations in major financial centers around the globe.23-3
As mentioned earlier, the Volcker Rule is viewed as the Dodd-Frcutk Ac't's
version of separation of investment banking from commercial banking by the
now-repealed Glass-Steagall Act and, accordingly, it has been dubbed 'Glass-
Steagall Lite' .234It follows that the Rule can be subject to many of the objections
raised against the G/ass-Steagall Act, which culminated in its erosion through
time and its repeal in 1999. For instance, the prohibitions of the Volcker Rule on
proprietary trading might increase systemic risk, because they will not allow
banking entities to adequately diversify their risks.235 However, it seems that
concerns about the adverse effects of the Volcker Rule on diversification in the
banking sector and its overall impact on financial stability is unfounded, because
it is only the idiosyncratic or firm-speciflrc risk (and not systemic risk) that can be
diversified away.236In addition, although diversifìcation originating from mixing
banking and non-banking activities can reduce the likelihood of individual bank
defaults, it may increase the likelihood of systemic risk.237 In other words,
integrated conglomerates composed of both banks and non-banks are financed
by risk-insensitive (or information-insensitive) deposits that weaken the market
discipline on their non-bank divisions.238 Therefore, non-bank divisions tend to
take more risks. Such a conclusion - that is to say, the cost of mixing traditionalbanking activities with other financial services within financial holding
companies (FHCs) increases the market risk of the frrm - is also supported
232 Thakor, supra note 133.
233 For example, the EU's Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)
contains more stringent regulations for the hedge fund industry than the regulatory
framework of hedge funds in the U.S. See Hossein Nabilou, "The Alternative I nve stment
Fund Managers Directive and Regulation of Hedge Funds'Potential Systentic Risks in
the EU'" (l I November 2013) SSRN Working Paper Series.
234 Acharya & Richardson , supra note 4 at 15.
235 See Leonardo Gambacorta & Adrian Van Rixtel, "structural bank regulation
initiatives: approaches and implications" (April 2013) BIS Working Paper No.4l2, 6,
online: Bank for International Settlements <http://www.bis.org/publ/work4l2.pdf >
(providing an overview ofthe economies ofscope in banking and discussing whether the
Volcker Rule leads to a loss of some diversifìcation benefìts).
236 Acharya & Richardson , supra note 4 at 15-16.
237 KevinJ.Stiroh&AdrienneRumble,"TheDarkSideofDiversification:TheCaseofUS
Financial Holding Companies" (2006), 30 Journal of Banking & Finance 2 I 3 I [Stiroh &
Rumblel.
238 Xavier Freixas et al., "Regulating financial conglomerates", (2007) 16 Journal of
Financial Intermediation 479.
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by recent empirical studies arguing that diversiflrcation gains ate more than offset
by the costs associated with the exposure to volatile activities.2r')
Another criticism, based on the analogy of the Volcker Rule with the G/r¡ss-
Steagall Act, is predicated on highlighting the potential forgone eff-rciencies in
terms of economies of scale and scope.2a0 Empirical evidence on optimal size of a
banking entity is mixed. On the one hand, it is suggested that the efficient size for
a banking entity might be very small.2al On the other hand, sonre empirical
evidence shows substantial economies ol scale in banking.2a2 In adclition, it is
suggested that big banks' profitability might not be attributable to effìciencies
created by their scale, but it should be studied in light of the irnplicit guarantces
offered to too-big-to-fail banks.2a3 The distortive impact of these guarantees is
such that some mergers in the banking sector were motivated by achieving too-
big-to-fail status and thereby gaining access to implicit government
guarantees.2aa Thus, it seems that theoretical and empirical evidence does not
strongly support objections to the Volcker Rule on the grounds that the Rule
stymies the benefits of diversification and economies of scale and scope in the
banking sector.
With respect to prohibiting cross-subsidization of hedge funds through
banks, the basic argument for the Volcker Rule is that letting fìnancial
institutions invest on their own accounts while funcling their activities at below-
market rates coming out of the government's explicit and implicit guarantees
cannot be justifìed.2as Indeed, in terms of cross-subsidization concerns, the
Volcker Rule and its exceptions strike a reasonable balance between preventing
such opportunistic behavior (taking advantage of government subsidies) while
not stifling investment by banks in hedge funds and privatc cquity funds,
particularly in those funds that are in the start-up phase.
23e Stiroh & Rumble, supra note 237. See also Wolf Wagner, "Diversification at fìnancial
institutions and systemic crises" (2010), l9 Journal of Financial lntermediation 373
(arguing that diversification can lead to more homogeneity in the financial sector by
exposing more financial institutions to similar risks).
240 Allen N. Berger et al.,"The Efficiency of Financial Institutions: A Revicw and Preview of
Research Past, Present and Future", (1993) 17 Special Issue on the Eflfìciency of
Financial Institutions 221 (providing an overview of the scale ancl scopc economies in
fìnancial institutions).
241 Ibid.
242 Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, "Who said large banks don't experience scale
economies? Evidence from a risk-return-driven cost flunction", (2013) 22 .lotlrnal of
Financial Intermediation 559.
243 Brewer & Jagtiani, supra note 177.
244 lbid.
2as This argument equally applies to other flrnancial institutions having access to
government subsides, especially Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and, implicitly, guaranteed enterprises, such as those
perceived to be too big to fail. See Acharya & Richardson, supro note 4 at 15.
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With respect to conflicts of interest, the extensive exceptions in the Volcker
Rule, both to proprietary trading and investment in hedge funds and private
equity funds, though marginally mitigating conflicts of interest, fall short of
providing a conflict-of-interest-proof environment for all stakeholders, notably
the banking entity, its customers, and hedge funds. However, it remains to be
seen how monitoring and management of conflicts of interest will be conducted
in practice.
4. CONCLUSION
The Volcker Rule pursues three main objectives: addressing problems arising
from the interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs; preventing cross-
subsidization of hedge funds by banks; and regulating conflicts of interest in the
relationships between banks, their customers, and hedge funds. These goals,
while imposing minimum distortions to market efficiency and competitiveness of
US financial institutions, provide benchmarks against which the success or
failure of the Volcker Rule should be evaluated.
This article concludes that, with respect to achieving its objectives, the
Volcker Rule can only ever be partially successful for several reasons. The fìrst
reason relates to the political compromises made during the legislative process,
which resulted in extensive exceptions to the Rule. Although backed by sound
legal and economic arguments, in many respects, these exceptions render the
Volcker Rule toothless. The underlying reason for such a claim lies in the
difficulty that will be encountered when trying to distinguish permitted activities
from prohibited activities. Since making such determinations will rely on
subjective and case-by-case evaluations, conducting such assessments makes
adequate enforcement of the Rule too costly and burdensome.
The second reason involves regulatory arbitrage. It is important not to allow
prohibited activities to occur anywhere within the entire banking entity and not
just within certain of its units. Moreover, prohibited activities are likely to move
to the more lightly-regulated shadow banking sector because of increased
regulatory costs for banks. Absent certain levels of international coordination,
the anticipated regulatory arbitrage could bring the Volcker Rule to its knees.
However, criticism of the Volcker Rule based on the claim that the Rule will
reduce liquidity and diversifìcation in fìnancial markets and institutions (and
thereby increasing systemic risk) appear to be unfounded. Theoretical and
empirical evidence suggests that the alleged economies of scale and scope by
mixing banking activities with proprietary and hedge fund-related activities
overlook the banking entities' access to implicit and explicit government
guarantees. Therefore, the claim that the Volcker Rule would impede the
realization of economies of scale and scope in the banking industry has not been
strongly supported.
With respect to cross-subsidization concerns, the Volcker Rule and its
exceptions strike a reasonable balance between preventing such opportunistic
behavior while not stifling investment by banks in start-up private funds. With
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regard to addressing conflicts of interest, the extensive exceptions in the Volcker
Rule, while marginally mitigating them, fall short of providing a conflict-of-
interest-free environment for all stakeholders. The limited intervention of the
Volcker Rule in addressing conflicts of interest can be explained by the relative
success of privateJaw mechanisms and market discipline in mitigating such
concerns.
